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Despite dramatic changes in the Northeast Asian security environment, America's
regional grand strategy has continued to be guided by inertia. This thesis contends that a
multipolar, balance of power system is emerging in Northeast Asia, and that the
appropriate U.S. response is to adopt a grand strategy of "selective engagement."
While the first half of this thesis focuses on U.S. security interests, the Northeast
Asian threat environment, and the shortcomings of post-Cold War U.S. policies, the
second half describes the diplomatic, military and economic attributes of a selective
engagement grand strategy. Recognizing that the age of geo-politics has not yet ended in
Northeast Asia. U.S. diplomacy would endeavor to maintain equilibrium and prevent the
rise of a regional hegemon by casting the United States in the role of balancer, grand
facilitator, and honest broker. Militarily, a selective engagement approach would
capitalize on the strengths of a maritime grand strategy to provide more flexibility at a
lower cost. Finally, a grand strategy of selective engagement would acknowledge the
centrality of economics to national security by linking economic policies directly to
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The international climate in which America's grand strategy must today operate is
far different from that of the 1950s, when it was designed. Without doubt, the most
striking change is the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw pact which together
accounted for one-half of a loosely bipolar world. The ideological factors and security
concerns that once bound states to their respective camps no longer serve as an effective
unifying force. Additionally, differential economic growth trends are changing the way
many nations view their role in the international community. Both in Europe and in
Northeast Asia—the two major playing fields of the Cold War—relatively predictable
bipolarism is being replaced with uncertain multipolarism.
This new era in global politics sets the context for American grand strategy. The
overriding strategic objective of the Cold War, containment of the Soviet threat within the
Eurasian rimlands, prompted a grand strategy that is no longer suitable for protecting
American interests throughout the world. A new strategic vision is needed to guide and
shape U.S. policy into a form appropriate for today's multipolar climate. International and
domestic considerations mandate that the United States adopt security policies that are both
more flexible and cost-effective.
The importance of creating a new framework for U.S. grand strategy should not
be underestimated. While the doctrine of containment and the clearly defined Soviet threat
provided logic and coherence to postwar U.S. national security policy, the current threat
environment is characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. Without an overriding
objective, it will become increasingly difficult to prioritize U.S. security interests,
resulting in an ad hoc approach to grand strategy. This type of strategy, in which vital
security interests are often confused with desirable objectives, poses the danger of pulling
U.S. security policy in one of two undesirable directions: unbridled internationalism or
traditional isolationism.
IX
This thesis contends that while the international climate in Northeast Asia has
changed dramatically in the last ten years, America's security policy has remained
stagnant. Specifically, this thesis argues that a multipolar balance of power system is
emerging in Northeast Asia, and that the appropriate U.S. response is to replace Cold
War-era grand strategy with a grand strategy of "selective engagement." Rather than
attempt to invent a new, monolithic threat to replace the Soviets, a grand strategy of
selective engagement accepts the notion that U.S. national security policy can no longer
be threat-driven, but should now be uncertainty-pulled.
In Chapter n. this thesis examines U.S. national security interests and how they
relate to grand strategy. Chapter HI surveys the Northeast Asian security environment,
and what challenges it poses to U.S. national interests. Chapter IV describes current U.S.
grand strategy in Northeast Asia, and its shortcomings vis-s-vis the post-Cold War security
environment.
The second half of this thesis, Chapters V through VTH, argues the merits of a
grand strategy of selective engagement. Chapter V describes the diplomatic, or foreign
policy, aspects of a post-Cold War grand strategy. Chapter VI proposes solutions to the
dilemma of Japan's enlarged role in Northeast Asia. Chapter VTJ elaborates on the
military component, and Chapter VTH the economic dimension of the grand strategy.
Finally, thesis conclusions are presented in Chapter IX.
I. INTRODUCTION
The post- Cold War era, which is being built on the ruins of the Soviet
empire and on the achievements ofdynamic, capitalist countries, is defined
by new balances ofpower, revised perceptions ofpower, andfar greater
diplomatic complexity. In this new era, regions have more distinct
identities, and international leadership is more ambiguous in structure and,
often, in the way it is exercised. Asia epitomizes the new complexity. 1
The international climate in which America's grand strategy must today operate is
far different from that of the 1950s, when it was designed. Without doubt, the most
striking change is the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw pact, which together
accounted for one-half of a loosely bipolar world. The ideological factors and security
concerns that once bound states to their respective camps no longer serve as an effective
unifying force. Additionally, differential economic growth trends are changing the way
many nations view their role in the international community. Both in Europe and in
Northeast Asia—the two major playing fields of the Cold War—relatively predictable
bipolarism is being replaced with uncertain multipolarism.
This new era in global pontics sets the context for American grand strategy. The
overriding strategic objective of the Cold War, containment of the Soviet threat within the
Eurasian rim lands, prompted a grand strategy that is no longer suitable for protecting
American interests throughout the world. A new strategic vision is needed to guide and
shape U.S. policy into a form appropriate for today's multipolar climate. International and
domestic considerations mandate that the United States adopt security policies that are both
more flexible and cost-effective.
The importance of creating a new framework for U.S. grand strategy should not
be underestimated. While the doctrine of containment and the clearly defined Soviet threat
1 Richard J. Ellings and Edward Olsen, "A New Pacific Profile," Foreign Policy
Winter 1992-93: 116.
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provided logic and coherence to postwar U.S. national security policy, the current threat
environment is characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. Without an overriding
objective, it will become increasingly difficult to prioritize U.S. security interests,
resulting in an ad hoc approach to grand strategy. This type of strategy, in which vital
security interests are often confused with desirable objectives, poses the danger of pulling
U.S. security policy in one of two undesirable directions: unbridled internationalism or
traditional isolationism.
This thesis contends that, while the international climate in Northeast Asia has
changed dramatically in the last ten years, America's security policy has remained
stagnant. Specifically, this thesis argues that a multipolar balance of power system is
emerging in Northeast Asia, and that the appropriate U.S. response is to replace Cold
War-era grand strategy with a grand strategy of "selective engagement." 2 Rather than
attempt to invent a new, monolithic threat to replace the Soviets, a grand strategy of
selective engagement accepts the notion that U.S. national security policy can no longer
be threat-driven, but should now be uncertainty-pulled*
Paul Kennedy, in his introduction to Grand Strategies in War and Peace, draws on
Edward Mead Earle and Sir Basi] Liddell Hart to define grand strategy as the orchestration
of elements of policy for the preservation of the nation's long-term interests that: are
concerned with both peacetime and wartime planning; reconciles and balances ends and
means; and goes beyond the battlefield to consider national morale, resources, culture, and
diplomacy. 4 John Collins in Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles, interprets grand
2 Term borrowed from Andrew C. Goldberg, "Selective Engagement: U.S. National
Security Policy in the 1990s," The Washington Quarterly Summer 1992: 15-24.
3 Colin Gray "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," The National Interest Fall 1992:
17.
4 (New Haven: Yale U Press, 1991) 1-7.
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strategy as "the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to
exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, force,
indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying
national security interests and objectives." 5
In Chapter II, this thesis examines U.S. national security interests and how they
relate to grand strategy. Chapter HI surveys the Northeast Asian security environment,
and what challenges it poses to U.S. national interests. Chapter IV will describe current
U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia, and its shortcomings vis-s-vis the post-Cold War
security environment.
The second half of this thesis. Chapters V through VTH, argues the merits of a
grand strategy of selective engagement. Chapter V describes the diplomatic, or foreign
policy, aspects of a post-Cold War grand strategy. Chapter VI proposes solutions to the
dilemma of Japan's role in Northeast Asia. Chapter VTJ elaborates on the military
component, and Chapter VIJJ the economic dimension of the grand strategy. Finally,
thesis conclusions are presented in Chapter IX.
5 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973) 14.
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II. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GRAND STRATEGY
'Cheshire puss, ' she began rather timidly, . . . 'would you tell me, please,
which way I ought to go from here ?
'
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to, ' said the cat.
Lewis Carroll. Alice in Wonderland"
Any discussion of grand strategy must begin with the interests and objectives upon
which it is based. "At the highest levels, national interests comprise the underpinnings for
sound strategy." 7 If the role of strategy is to rationally relate means to ends, then our task
in analyzing current strategies and proposing new ones must begin with an examination of
U.S. security interests. National security interests, vis-a-vis the goals and objectives to
which they give rise, act as the fundamental ends served by a grand strategy. The purpose
of this chapter is to survey the broad spectrum of opinion concerning America's security
interests, and determine which are the most enduring and salient ones in the post-Cold War
environment.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in revising or creating any policy is reaching a
consensus on interests. Among academics and policy-makers there is a nearly limitless
range of views concerning national security. Moreover, while policy-makers may agree
on a general set of security interests, they often disagree on the weight, or relative priority
of individual objectives. Such has been the case of American foreign and security policies
for over 200 years, as "realist" policies have clashed with "idealist" policies, sometimes
referred to as Wilsonianism.
6 Quoted in Collins Grand Strategy 1
7
Collins Grand Strategy 1
.
A. OFFICIAL U.S. INTERESTS WORLDWIDE
Official government documents provide the most authoritative, yet still diverse
account of U.S. national security interests. The 1991-1992 National Security Strategy of




The survival ofthe Umted States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual
prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations.
4. A stable arid secure world, where political and economicfreedom, human
rights, and democratic institutions flourish. 8
The policy statements of the Clinton administration concerning national security
interests have reflected both change and continuity with the past. In place of the Bush
administration's four overarching interests. A National Security Strategy ofEngagement
and Enlargement states generally that the U.S. government is responsible for protecting
the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintaining the political freedom and
independence of the nation, and providing for the nation's well-being and prosperity. In
order to facilitate these interests, the 1994 document focuses on three primary objectives:
enhancing security through military means, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting
democracy abroad.
8 George Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington:
USGPO. 1991).
B. OFFICIAL U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA
Addressing East Asia and the Pacific specifically, the Clinton strategy "envisions
an integrated strategy-a New Pacific Community—which links security requirements with
economic realities and our concern for democracy and human rights." 9 While the three
pillars of this "New Pacific Community" that are spelled out by the document are not
ultimate "ends." but rather are means, the basic security interest at the heart of each is
evident. First, the strategy points to the importance of combatting the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula and in South Asia. Second, it
encourages the development of "multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and
opportunities." Lastly, the strategy urges support for the "wave of democratic reform
sweeping the region." 10
A 1992 Department of Defense report to Congress, entitled A Strategic Framework
for the Asian Pacific Rim. proposed a set of Asia-specific goals that included both ends and
means:
Protection of the United Stales and its alliesfrom attack;
Maintaining regional peace and stability;
Preserving U. S. political and economic access;
Contributing to nuclear deterrence;
Fostering the growth of democracy and human rights;
Stopping the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
and ballistic missile systems;
Ensuring freedom of navigation; and
9 The White House, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement
(Washington: USGPO, 1994) 23.
10 Engagement and Enlargement 24.
• Reducing illicit drug trafficking. 1 '
Another indicator of security interests as perceived by the Clinton foreign policy
team was provided by Winston Lord during his confirmation hearings for Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on March 31 . 1993. Lord designated
the following ten major goals, not listed in any order, for American policy in Asia and the
Pacific:
Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature
balance of responsibilities;
Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the
Korean peninsula;
Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China where political
openness catches up with economic reform;
Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope;
Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we
normalize our relations with Vietnam;
Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia;
Strengthening APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as the
cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation;
Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining
the solid foundations of our alliances;
Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment,
refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms sales; and
Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower. 12
" Department of Defense, A Strategic Frameworkfor the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to
Congress 1992 (Washington: USGPO, 1992) 2-9.
12 Karen A. Hasselman. "The National Interests of the United States in Southeast Asia:
Policy Changes for Their Protection and Promotion Since the Withdrawal from the Naval
8
C. DETERMINING BROAD AND ENDURING INTERESTS
An examination of executive branch policy statements highlights several obstacles
in determining the national security interests of the United States. The first difficulty is
separating interests from objectives. Though often used interchangeably in policy
declarations, the difference is important. For instance, the most vital of national security
interests is certainly the "survival of the State, with an 'acceptable' degree of
independence, territorial integrity, traditional lifestyles, fundamental institutions, values,
and honor intact." 13 This is unquestionably a security interest, and also one on which the
overwhelming majority of American citizens could agree. "Developing multilateral
forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances,"
however, is not a core national interests, but an objective through which an interest can
be served. While one Administration may believe America's security depends on its
alliance relationships, another may not.
A second complication stems from the varying degrees of importance different
Administrations place on different interests. For example, both the Bush and Clinton
national security strategies list the promotion of democratic values as an important interest,
but the Clinton approach places far more emphasis on "democratic enlargement," and
actually elevates it from a mere interest to a essential security policy tool. Throughout
America's history security interests have waxed and waned in relative importance as public
opinion and national leadership have expressed shifting priorities. Because grand
strategies are meant to provide a framework for long-term planning, the interests that guide
those policies must be broad and enduring. In order to ensure a fresh start, it is necessary
Base at Subic Bay," Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 1993: 16.
13
Collins Grand Strategy 1.
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to go right to the heart of the national security interests served by a grand strategy. There
is no better place to start than the Constitution of the United States. The preamble states:
We the People of the United States, in Order toform a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings ofLiberty
to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States ofAmerica.
Although the first three clauses are distinctly domestic issues, the last three have
obvious implications for national security. A more modern phrasing might read "ensure
the defense of the United States, its citizens and possessions from foreign attack; foster
the economic well-being of the nation; and safeguard the U.S. constitutional system, and
the liberties it guarantees from subversion or external interference." While more
ephemeral concerns may also hold validity, these immutable interests should always form
the core of any national security concept.
Donald Nuechterlein, in his 1991 book America Recommitted: United States
National Interests in a Restructured World, argues that throughout "the nation's history
four long-term, enduring national interests have conditioned the way the U.S. government
viewed the external world and this country's place in it." These enduring interests
accurately reflect the core interests of the United States as they are defined by the
Constitution, and add to them some basic interests that have developed since its drafting:
1. The defense of the United States and its constitutional system;
2. The enliancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of
U. S. products abroad;
3. The creation of a favorable world order (international security
environment); and
10
4. The promotion abroad of U. S. democratic values and the free market
system.
N
These broad interests are the ends to be served by U.S. grand strategy. In order
to link these ends with available assets, or means, it is first necessary to determine
objectives. By applying U.S. national security interests to Northeast Asia, it is possible
to gain an understanding of the types of objectives that might be accomplished by a grand
strategy.
D. DETERMINING U.S. OBJECTIVES IN NORTHEAST ASIA
America's broad and enduring interests-the defense of the United States;
enhancement of nation's economic well-being; creation of favorable world order: and
promotion of U.S. values abroad~can be applied to contemporary Northeast Asia in order
to determine America's most fundamental objectives in that region. Although many more
specific objectives could be suggested, this thesis contends that U.S. interests in the region
would be best facilitated by: (1) the maintenance of Northeast Asian stability; and (2)
guarding against the emergence of a regional hegemon, be it military, political, or
economic. Hence, these interest-derived objectives should be the ends served by the
means of grand strategy.
14 (Lexington: U of Kentucky Press, 1991) 17.
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ID. THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The grand strategy of the United States acts as the link between national assets and
objectives. Strategy, however, does not operate in a vacuum. If grand strategy is to be
effective, this flexible connection between ends and means must adapt to its environment.
The changes that have occurred in Northeast Asia's security climate, beginning in the early
1970s and culminating with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, mandate a reappraisal of U.S.
security policy. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the complex and potentially
threatening environment that is developing in Northeast Asia, and the dangers it presents to
American security interests.
At the heart of the post-Cold War climate in Northeast Asia is a transformation in the
fundamental structure of the international system. The loosely bipolar arrangement that had
existed since 1945 has given way to a far more complex pattern of relationships. Where
power was formerly concentrated primarily in the hands of the United States and the Soviet
Union, second-order powers like Japan and China are gaining importance and influence,
particularly at the regional level. While the United States may remain the only true
superpower well into the next century, the emergence of local great powers could signal a
unique structural dichotomy, in which global unipolarity coexists with regional multipolarity.
Aaron Friedberg postulates:
The movement toward 'multi-multipolarity' is being propelled by political
developments as much as by shifts in the underlying distribution of material
resources. In this new and more fragmented world, the United States will still
be the richest and strongest nation (although the size of its economic and
military leads will diminish as others grow faster and as the United States
reduces its armed forces), but it will be less inclined to project its power into
every corner of the globe. Meanwhile, otfier nations will become more capable
13
of acting independently in pursuit of their own interests and, whether out of
ambition or necessity, more inclined to do so.'5
The bipolarity that once existed in Northeast Asia was a creation of the Cold War
which began in Europe, and spread to Asia as the United States and the Soviet Union divided
the world into spheres of ideological influence. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union
came the final blow to bipolarity. No longer constrained by security concerns, Japan has
begun to parlay its status as an economic superpower into regional influence, and possibly
leadership.
16
Beijing, which found itself marginalized in world politics by the easing of
Moscow-Washington tensions, has likewise embarked on a course designed to increase China's
regional influence.
17
Even Seoul, no longer content to rely on the United States for guidance,
has begun to contemplate the role of South Korea, or a unified Korea, in a multipolar
Northeast Asia. 18
Northeast Asia may be the most heavily militarized region in the world. Though the
United States will continue to hold an overall lead in military capability into the foreseeable
future, locally U.S. forces could face formidable threats. Similarly, economic success has
increased the leverage of regional powers. South Korea has created a strong economy and a
15 Aaron L Friedberg. "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,"
International Security Wmter 1993-94 6
16 See Chalmers Johnson, "Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role, Daedalus Fall 1992: 1-33.
17 See Weixing Hu. "China's Security Strategy in a Changing World," Pacific Focus
Spring 1993: 1 13-134., and Bonnie S. Glaser "China's Security Perceptions: Interests and
Ambitions," Asian Survey March 1993:252-271
.
'* See Han Sung-Joo. "Fundamentals of Korea's New Diplomacy," Korea and World
Affairs Summer 1993: 227-245., and Cha Young-Koo and Kim Taeho, "The Emerging World
Order and Korea's Changing Security Climate in Northeast Asia," Korea and World Affairs
Spring 1993 111-134
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diverse portfolio of trading partners. Moreover, many economists have forecast that the gross
domestic product of China may surpass that of the United States early in the next century. 19
These political, military, and economic realities suggest that the distribution of power
that has characterized Northeast Asia since the Second World War is a thing of the past.
Because this Cold War hierarchy provided the context in which American security policy has
operated for nearly the last five decades, U.S. diplomacy will need to make adjustments to the
new conditions. Future state-to- state relations in Northeast Asia are likely to be far more
intricate and uncertain. The "strategic triangle" (PRC-USSR-US) that Beijing's leadership
endeavored to construct has blossomed into a complex pattern of relations among states, each
with its own agenda, strengths, and liabilities.
This increased complexity of international relations is not in itself a threat to regional
security. In fact. Northeast Asia may prove more stable with five or six major powers than
with two or three. The context in which U.S. grand strategy must operate, however, has
changed. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has not produced a benign regional threat
environment. On the contrary, a number of factors—both structural and domestic—provide
reason for concern. The remainder of this chapter will address these complications.
A. UNLEASHING INDIGENOUS CONFLICT
The first concern is that indigenous conflicts, long suppressed by the Cold War and the
attendant bipolar structure, will resurface. The potential sources of Northeast Asian conflict
are plentiful, and at a minimum include: long-standing Sino-Russian border disputes;
competing Russian and Japanese claims to the Northern Territories or Southern Kurile Islands;
the unresolved dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in the
southern Sea of Japan; divided sovereignty on the Korean peninsula, where 1.4 million ground
19 Murray Weidenbaum. "Greater China: A New Economic Colossus," The Washington
Quarterly Autumn 1993 77
15
forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
remain deployed against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ); competing
sovereignty claims of the Chinese regimes on mainland China and Taiwan; the unresolved
dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea;
and because of their potential impact on the vital oil and trade routes of the South China Sea,
the competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands among China, Vietnam. Brunei.
Malaysia. Taiwan and the Philippines. 20
Although it can be argued that Europe may face a similar rebirth of indigenous
conflict, there is a crucial difference between the two regions. While there has been the
development of a plethora of multilateral regimes in Europe during the past forty years, this
has not occurred in Asia. According to Friedberg:
Next to Europe. Asia appears strikingly under-institutionalized. The rich
'alpliabet soup' of international agencies that has helped to nurture peaceful
relations among the European powers is, in Asia, a very thin gruel indeed. 21
During the Cold War. the overriding gravity of superpower confrontation decreased
the salience of many regional and sub-regional animosities, however, the redistribution of
Northeast Asian power to multiple poles could now allow them to reemerge. For now,
conflict resolution in Northeast Asia will have to depend upon progress in bilateral relations,
though there is little historical experience to guide this process. In fact, there is almost no
record of indigenous modern international relations in the region. "For almost all of this
century Asia has been dominated by foreign powers: first the European empires and later the
superpowers." 22 Without effective bilateral relations or multilateral forums to ameliorate
20 Desmond Ball. "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,"
International Security Winter 1993-94: 88
21
Friedberg 22.
22 Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival Summer
1994 7-8
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tensions, flareups could present a threat to Northeast Asian stability in general, and U.S.
interests specifically.
B. DIFFERENTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
A second danger related to the developing multipolar structure is that differential
economic growth could create tensions among the new great powers, most probably between
China and Japan. Denny Roy, in his article "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to
East Asian Security," advances this argument on a number of points:
/ argue that a burgeoning China poses a long-term danger to Asia-Pacific
security for two reasons. First, despite Japan's present economic strength, a
future Chinese hegemony in East Asia is a strong possibility. China is just
beginning to realize its vast economic potential, while Japan's inherent
weaknesses create doubts about the ability of the Japanese to increase or
sustain their present level ofeconomic power. China also faces less resistance
t/ian Japan to building a superpower-sized military. Second, a stronger China
is likely to undermine peace in the region. Economic development will make
China more assertive and less cooperative with its neighbors; China 's domestic
cfiaracterisrics make it comparatively likely to use force to achieve its political
goals; and an economically powerful China might provoke a military buildup
by Japan, plunging Asia into a new cold war. 13
In economic terms, there is no doubt that China has the potential for great power.
While conventional measures indicate an economically tri-polar world, revolving around the
United States. Japan and the European Community (particularly Germany), in terms of global
trade, market size and "sheer economic bulk," China is becoming a fourth pole in the
international system. This is particularly true if one looks at "Greater China," consisting of
the People's Republic, Hong Kong and Taiwan. World Bank projections place Greater
China's net imports in the year 2002 at US$639 billion, compared to US$521 billion for
International Security Summer 1994: 149-150.
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Japan. Moreover, using comparable international prices, Greater China in the year 2002 is
projected to have a gross domestic product of US$ 9.8 trillion, compared to US$ 9.7 trillion
for the United States. "If those forecasts hold, in other words. Greater China would not just
be another economic pole: it would be the biggest of them all." 24
The realist notion that an increasingly wealthy China will create tension in East Asia
runs contrary to contemporary liberal arguments that greater economic interdependence
decreases the likelihood of military conflict. However, there are at least four reasons to
qualify this optimism. First, the degree of interdependence that actually exists varies greatly
from state to state in the region, and even within states themselves, such as in China. China
and Taiwan have not yet become members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and even when they join, the process of achieving greater transparency and openness
is likely to provoke resistance from powerful vested interests. 25
The second qualifier to the optimism of post-modern liberalism contends that rapid
economic growth notwithstanding, levels of interdependence within East Asia have failed to
keep pace with the European Union. Regional trends suggest that the most developed states
in Northeast Asia are seeking global rather than local connections. Although the states of
Northeast Asia may be willing to discuss greater openness in trade with North America or
Europe, they seem unwilling to do so in their own backyard. As the economies of Northeast
Asia continue to develop they should be better able to provide markets for each other, but the
absence of an effective regional economic institution suggests that the disputes that will arise
from the contest for market share are likely to be acrimonious. 26
A third qualifier to the logic of liberal optimism in Northeast Asia is that economic
interdependence is not necessarily a protection against tension and conflict. As demonstrated
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by the U.S. -Japanese relationship before the Second World War, economic interests have often
been advanced as a reason to intervene, rather than a cause for abstention. Neither has
interdependence quieted the arguments of Northeast Asian geo-politicians who continue to
underscore the military aspects of national economic security in regions such as the South
China Sea and the Russian Far East. 27
Finally, we should approach critically the tendency of those who advance the
interdependence argument to use Europe as an example that greater economic integration
makes conflict less likely. While it may be true that democracies seldom fight each other, it
is not true that all market economies are democratic. Although most European nations are
now democracies. Northeast Asia contains: two non-Western democracies (Japan and South
Korea): one authoritarian, proto-capitalist state (China); one Stalinist regime (North Korea),
and one large question mark (Russia). "What is certainly true is that these political and
economic cultures are less transparent than Western models and, therefore, conflict and
misunderstanding among them are more likely." 28
C. GEO-POLITICAL THINKING IN MOSCOW AND BEIJING
The third general danger associated with the international system evolving in Northeast
Asia is that this structure will encourage the regional predisposition to think "geo-politically."
Its nuclear deterrent notwithstanding, Moscow's proclivity to think in nineteenth century
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balance of power terms has been evident throughout the Soviet period and continues to this
day.
Russia is likely to remain weak in the Far East well into the next century. Many of
Russia's leaders believe that because of this weakness, the nation's interests in Northeast Asia
are now more dependent on a stable regional balance of power. Alexei Arbatov, in his article
"Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives." asserts:
In the Far East the interests of Russia (in contrast to those of the USSR) may
be best served by the maintenance of an American political role and military
presence. In the case of a US withdrawal, Japanese reaction could be no
other than remilitarization, in view of the rapid growth of the economic and
militaiy power of China.
29
This concern with Japan highlights a trend in Russian security thinking. Russians are
now more preoccupied with regional security issues than they were during the Cold War.
Uncertainties near Russia's frontiers with Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, North Korea and
Japan have sent the Kremlin in search of reliable partners.
Of growing importance in Russian domestic politics is a loose grouping of moderate-
liberals who claim to be represented in governmental, political, and academic circles. Self-
proclaimed moderate-liberals, such as Alexei Arbatov, contend that their views are more
realistic and pragmatic than those of the "pro-Western" Yeltsin group, and insist on the
necessity of a distinctly Russian foreign policy. They assert that Russia's foreign and security
policies should be based on the specifics of its geo-political position and its transitional
domestic situation. 30
Leszek Buszynski refers to the moderate-liberals as the "geopolitical" opinion group.
Buszynski's "geopoliticals" perceive the current leadership's political values as the product of
a premature effort to associate with the West, thereby outstripping the geo-political and
29 International Security 18.2 (1993) 36.
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security needs of Russia, "which is predominantly located in Asia." 31 The geopolitical
believe Moscow has. for economic reasons, placed too much emphasis on Japan, and not
enough on China. They see Japan "as a traditional rival of Russia," and regard China as a
balancing force. 32 This group of moderate-liberals is but one element of a growing segment
of Russian thinkers and statesmen who believe that given Russia's weakness, its regional
security objectives in Northeast Asia can be best met by returning to traditional balance of
power policies, which rely less on unilateral strength, and more on the balancing behavior of
other states to counter the growth of a regional hegemon.
Rather than structuring its policies to facilitate entry into a interdependent world, in
which trans-border concerns have, to some degree, altered traditional precepts of state
sovereignty. Beijing seems "to be patiently embarked on a new 'Long March' to become the
first among roughly equal great powers that can enjoy freedom of action through a strong
military presence and posture in a neo-imperial manner." 33 David Shambaugh in his article,
"Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," discusses the political culture and
national historical experiences that have shaped China's world view:
Viefirst of these is the Chinese sense of impermanence. Chinese leaders and
international relations specialists believe the world is in constant flux as
national power increases and decreases relative to other nations. Stasis is seen
as an abnormal and deceptive condition. Disequilibrium is the norm. Constant
and careful attention is, therefore, paid to incremental shifts in the balance of
power and constituent elements ofpower. Realist theory has found a receptive
audience among China's international relations community. At any given time,
some nations are in the ascent (gong) while others are in relative decline
(shou). Sometimes nations in internal decline seek to expand their power
.11
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externally, which Oiinese analysts argue is the case with the U.S. today. Paul
Kennedy 's The. Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is currently very popular in
China's strategic studies circles. 34
This belief in the impernianence of relationships requires maintaining independence and
flexibility, characteristics that enable the Chinese to make their presence felt in ephemeral
alignments and ad hoc coalitions. These non-binding political, military, and economic
relationships are not perceived in Beijing as a compromise to China's jealously guarded
sovereignty. Furthermore, these arrangements provide the fluidity Beijing deems necessary
to participate in the balance of power game. The "strategic triangle" that Beijing sought to
cultivate in its Cold war-era superpower relations is one example of this geo-political mindset.
Current patterns of Chinese bilateral relations suggest an ongoing concern with the balance of
power.
Most Chinese officials and scholars perceive the world in balance of power terms, and
look for differences among major powers that can be exploited to protect and advance
Beijing's interests. 35 Chen Qimao, Chairman of the Academic Council of the Shanghai Institute
for International Studies, offers a Chinese view of the post-Cold War environment:
/he world is transformingfrom a bipolar to a multipolar structure and is now in
a volafHe situation of strategic imbalance. While the old tension between the
superpowers has lapsed and some old regional rivalries have been solved or
alleviated, new territorial disputes, ethnic strife, and religious differences left
over from history but disguised by the bipolar structure are beginning to
resurface and intensify in some areas, causing serious turmoil and even bloody
conflict and Mar. Forces are being realigned... international economic
competition is growing bitter, replacing the arms race as the main form of
rivalry among the major powers. 26
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Another source of geo-political thinking in modern China stems from the belief that
nations behave according to their position in a particular historical epoch and type of political-
economic system. Marxist, Leninist and Maoist stage theories of history and international
relations still "implicitly underlie many Chinese assessments of world affairs and international
security
" 37
.Although the Chinese have softened their assessment of the West somewhat, Lenin's
theory of imperialism and Mao's concept of hegemonism still play an important role in Beijing's
world view "Anti-hegemonism remains the sine qua non of Chinese foreign policy, deriving
largely from modern China's historical experience of encroachment, partition and manipulation
by foreign powers." 38
In the wake of the Cold War. China's geo-political world view may influence its leaders
to perceive the United States—the only remaining superpower—as a serious threat to the
Northeast Asian balance of power Beijing characterizes U.S. grand strategy in post-Cold War
Asia as designed to ensure American primacy, or even hegemony. Chinese analysts identify three
elements in a strategy begun by the Bush administration, and continued by President Clinton, that
seeks to create a "New World Order" in which America would reign preeminent diplomatically,
militarily and economically The first element aims to create a multilateral security organization
to reinforce US bilateral treaties and security arrangements The second component consist of
an aggressive free trade policy that is, in reality, a protectionist measure designed to pressure
Asian states into giving .American businesses unfair advantages. The final element involves a US
attempt to use the issues of human rights and democratization to subvert governments unfriendly
to the United States
1y
China's response to geo-political threats could have several implications for regional
security and U S interests First, Beijing may react to perceived foreign hegemony in a
17 Shambaugh "Growing Strong" 45-46
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historically Chinese way by expanding the buffer zones around the "middle kingdom." Although
further expansion on land is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out Expansion of China's maritime
buffers, however, seems to be a reality China is beginning to think less like a continental power,
and more in maritime terms No longer confident of their central strategic position, leaders of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) have begun to regard the oceans as an extension of the land
buffers China has historically sought 4U Moreover, Beijing can no longer ignore the fact that
China's astounding economic growth is inextricably tied to maritime matters. It is becoming
apparent to China's leaders that the People's Republic needs a capable, ocean-going navy to
defend against infringements on its rights to navigation, mineral resources, and fishing grounds. 41
Another possible Chinese reaction to geo-political threats may be to limit Beijing's
participation in multilateral security and economic forums. China's propensity to mild autarky,
and apparent aversion to interdependence and integration is a direct outgrowth of its historical
experiences with compromised state sovereignty and hegemonism:
Underlying Beijing's condemnation of unipolar hegemonism lies a world view
shared by ( 'hina's elite that is more appropriate to the late sixteenth, rather than
the twentieth, century. It is a view premised on immutable state sovereignty, in
which sirid non-interference in the internal affairs of other states is the abiding
norm.
J'
Finally, the most likely Chinese response to perceived systemic threats is the construction
of a foreign policy that is designed to reap geo-political advantage by cultivating good relations,
and possibly alignments with non-threatening partners, while avoiding alliance and long-term
commitments that might limit flexibility Some Senior PLA officers regard the United States as
China's principal adversary today and in the foreseeable future, and favor a security alignment
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with Russia ^ Other Chinese predict that in the long run the United States will "seek a new
strategic partnership with China, perhaps to counter Japanese power in Asia or to resist a
resurgent, expansionist Russia." and have even suggested that Japan will seek a tacit strategic
partnership with China to counter American power. 44
D. DOMESTIC INSTABILITY
Dangers to Northeast Asian stability and American interests do not result solely from the
multipolar international structure and its characteristics; they also have domestic sources in each
or" the region's states Particularly ominous is the possibility that China, torn apart by differential
growth among the provinces, or by the contradictions of economic liberalization without
corresponding political change, might collapse into civil war and chaos. An economic and
political disintegration of the People's Republic could bring about a situation reminiscent of
China's warlord era in the first half of this century Neighboring states—either in response to
perceived dangers such as refugees or factional violence, or possibly seeking to regain territory
once lost to an expansionist China—might feel compelled to intervene, thus drawing more of the
region into conflict Conversely, a besieged Beijing regime, believing a foreign episode may
distract the disgruntled masses from domestic issues might initiate a pedagogical or irredentist
expedition against a vulnerable neighbor Finally, the Chinese empire could, in a relatively
peaceful manner, breakup into several autonomous states, thus creating new sources of potential
tension and exponentially complicating regional interstate relations. 45
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A similar threat of instability and conflict is posed by the political and economic woes
prevailing throughout the Russian Republic. While the fragmentation of the former Soviet empire
has thus far been limited to European and Central Asian regions, the possibility of a breakaway
Siberian republic cannot be discounted Moreover, the tumultuous situation within Russia may
eventually prove too much for the moderate Yeltsin government, and give rise to an ultra-
nationalist or reactionary regime As demonstrated by the frightening proclamations of Russian
nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky's December 1993 remarks to the effect that he would
"... sail our large navy around their (the Japanese) small island and if they so much as cheeped,
I would nuke them," 46 a hard-line government might appeal to nationalist affinities in the
humiliated Russian people, and set out to reclaim the lost territory of "Great Russia."
E. THE KOREAN DILEMMA
The peaceful reunification of the Koreas, while generally a positive step for Northeast
Asian stability would also create a number of new issues and anxieties. Not only would a unified
Korea possess an extremely large and well-armed military force, but in all likelihood it would be
capable of producing and deploying nuclear weapons. Although a Korea unified under Seoul's
terms would presumably embrace market-democracy, its threatening potential would nonetheless
continue to trouble Japan Aggravating this situation would be Korea's historical (and pragmatic)
predilection to fall into China's orbit While Korea would be a geo-political "card" any Northeast
Asian power would be happy to hold, its alignment with the People's Republic could be cause
for consternation in Japan, the United States, and possibly Russia.
46 Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century," The Journal of
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F. A NEW ROLE FOR JAPAN
Finally. Japan's transformation from an economic power to a "normal" great power could
be perceived as a threat by the nations of Northeast Asia. Contemporary debate in Japan points
10 several international and domestic pressures for a change in Japan's post-World War II national
securit\ doctrine First among them is the inevitable and ongoing evolution of the U.S. -Japan
relationship The end of the Cold War and Japan's meteoric rise to economic great power status
have altered the salience of issues As the United States and Japan struggle to resolve matters
Mich as the trade imbalance and Japan's international role in the post-Cold War world, the old
relationship is bound to change A related factor is the absence of a unifying threat, like the
Soviet Union, to help smooth over non-security related differences .Although presently a minor
force, a rising tide of Japanese nationalism might also influence Japan's world view Finally.
Japan's desire to be treated like a traditional great power, and not just an economic force has
fueled the domestic grand strategy debate. 47 If this internal debate brings about a recasting of
Japan's foreign and security policies to a form more fitting to a normal great power, the
repercussions throughout the region could be significant. Without reliable multilateral institutions
to assuage the concerns of China. Russia, and the Koreas, their historical fear of Japanese
expansionism could result in a destabilizing chain of actions and reactions
G. MILITARY TRENDS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Threats to Northeast Asian peace and stability also emanate from regional trends in
military procurement and strategy Although these military issues are not necessarily dangerous,
when they are considered together with the structural and domestic factors discussed above, they
paint a picture of region characterized by peril and uncertainty. Four broad trends are evident in
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Northeast Asian military security thinking First, the widespread conviction that quality is more
important than quantity has made technological modernization a universal objective. This trend
is not limited to China, Japan and Russia, but is apparent throughout the region Desmond Ball.
in his article "Arms and Affluence Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," notes a
significant degree of consistencv in regional arms-buying programs. Systems that have elicited
the most interest include
national command, control and communications systems;
national strategic and tactical intelligence systems;
multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack and air superiority capabilities:
maritime surveillance aircraft;
anti-ship missiles;
modern surface combatants—destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels;
submarines:
electronic warfare systems: and
rapid deployment forces.
It is worthwhile to note that Ball was not writing solely about systems with maritime application.
Without question, this congruence in acquisition manifests a regional focus on naval and maritime
issues
The second regional trend reflects a transformation in force structure. Although the
armed forces of many smaller Asia-Pacific nations are becoming larger, the armies and fleets of
the great powers of Northeast Asia are becoming smaller. China has embarked on a deliberate and
long-term plan to convert its huge, but ineffective fleet of 1950s and 60s vintage aircraft, tanks
and patrol boats into a smaller, more balanced fighting force. Although much of Russia's military
downsizing is not intentional, naval leaders have nevertheless embraced fully the notion that
Russian interests will be better served by a smaller, more modern defense establishment. 49
Particularly indicative of this trend are recommendations by the Japanese prime minister's defense
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advisors that the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF). which is already a small, highly capable
force, be reduced further in size to make funds available for modernization. 50 The implications of
this shift are that the great powers of Northeast Asia, particularly China, are transforming their
large, rail-transported, defensive armies into smaller, more mobile forces, better suited for rapid.
offensive operations
An increased ability to project power distinguishes the third regional trend. The last
decade has seen China establish a marine corps, and construct the necessary sea- and airlift to
transport large PLA units Some analysts believe China now has the capability to deploy an entire
division beyond its shores 5I Japanese planners have called for an expansion of the SDF's meager
airlift and amphibious forces with the justification that such a capacity would provide greater
mobility to self-defense forces among the Japanese home islands, and would be useful in
conducting international relief operations Russia's new military doctrine stresses the importance
of air and maritime forces capable of striking an opponent's key installations, however Moscow
is unlikely to provide much funding for these forces until the domestic situation improves.
The final, and potentially most dangerous trend in Northeast Asian military thinking is the
unambiguous genesis of a "cult of the offensive." Much like the dogma responsible for European
offensive war doctrines prior to World War I. military officers and strategists in Russia and China
have become convinced that aggressive preemption is the most viable form of defense. In
contrast to the chiefly defensive doctrines that prevailed in post-World War II East Asia, Russian
and Chinese strategic thinking is dominated by the so-called "lessons" of Desert Storm, and the
military-technical revolution Evident in Russian military and academic writing and Chinese force
reconstruction is an overt or underlying belief in striking first, striking hard, and striking fast The
passive defense implies inaction, and the consequences of inaction are perceived to be sudden
annihilation
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Perhaps more than anv other event, the conduct of the GulfWar has changed the way that
the Soviets, and their Russian successors view modern warfare Russian military strategists are
nearly unanimous in their conviction that allied doctrine in Operation Desert Storm heralded the
beginnings of an age of "electronic-fire." high-tech war. General-Major IN Vorob'yev recentlv
summarized the central lessons of Desert Storm, beginning with a statement unprecedented for
both the Soviet and Russian press: the Iraqis lost the Gulf War because they fought with Soviet
doctrine and Soviet weaponry Moreover. Vorob'yev calls for new military thinking from Russia's
officers, who he asserts are still preparing to fight World War II:
According to I 'oroh'yev. Desert Storm was one of those rare 'turning points' in
military affairs—akin to the Franco-Prussian War—that stands at the juncture of
two epochs in military art. It ended the era of multimilhon-man armies and
began thai of high-technology wars fought in the air. space, and 'ether
(airwaves). ' While in past wars new armaments were employed only singly, in
Desert Storm a multitude of new systems was used on a mass scale. 52
An examination of the writings of prominent Russian strategic thinkers reveals a belief in
several related tenets comprising this paradigm of technological warfare. First, the initial period
of the war. in which the aggressor will make coordinated, simultaneous attacks throughout the
entire depth of the defender's territory, will be decisive. Second, the increased potency of air and
naval forces, particularly when matched with advanced conventional munitions (ACMs). will
render the massed deployment of ground formations by the aggressor unnecessary and, by the
defender, unwise. Third, the age of positional, or combined positional-maneuver warfare has
given way to complete dominance by maneuver warfare strategies. Finally, strategic non-nuclear
forces, utilizing ACM technology will become essential for both attack and deterrence. 53
These perceived trends have important implications for Russian military doctrine and
strategy Possibly the most far-reaching belief is that defensive, non-aggressive doctrines are not
' : Mary C FitzGerald. "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Naval War College Review
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effective in the new age of warfare Related to this are the convictions that the enemy must be
engaged as far forward as possible, and that preemption is necessary to gain the decisive
advantage of the initial period Stemming from this reverence for high-tech offensives is the
assumption that ACM. electronic warfare (EW). and C3I (Command. Control. Communications
and Intelligence) technologies are crucial to Russia's security Furthermore, the creation of a
reliable defense against both tactical and strategic ACMs is viewed as essential. Indeed, one of
the most interesting implications of this modern war paradigm is the inference that the lines
between tactics and strategy are disappearing. This concept is rooted in the belief that strategic
aims can now be accomplished in the initial phase of conflict, conceivably in one overwhelming
tactical victorv
' 4
Marv FitzGerald. in her 1993 article "Russia's New Military Doctrine," compares this
work with the 1990 Soviet military doctrine and finds at least five key changes. First, the primary
wartime objective of the armed forces has expanded from "to repel aggression" to "repel
aggression and defeat the opponent." Second, in 1990 the main development goal was to
structure forces to "repel aggression;" in 1992. it is to "optimize" the table of organization and
equipment for all possible wars and combat missions. Third, while the Soviet version held that
nuclear war "will" be catastrophic for all mankind, the Russian document holds that it "might be,"
and implies that limited nuclear war-fighting is now a possibility. Fourth, the 1990 doctrine held
that conventional "sufficiency" meant that no large-scaie offensive operations could be conducted
In 1992. however, conventional "sufficiency" means that no large-scale offensive operations can
be conducted "without additional deployments " Finally, the 1990 doctrine stressed that Soviet
military art was based on "defensive strategy," and that the USSR excluded the option of a
preemptive strike. The 1992 doctrine deletes these provisions, and maintains that the Russian
FitzGerald 26-33
armed forces will conduct "all forms of military action." will conduct defense and offense equally.
and will seize the strategic initiative to destroy the opponent.^
By the mid-1980s, it was evident that China's leadership perceived changes in the regional
seeuntY environment Improved relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union had
created a far less threatening environment in East Asia, however, new types of instability were
becoming more probable, or at least more salient. Beijing now considered local, limited conflicts
to be the most likely threat to the security interests of China While these threats were not




The new security climate brought about by these changes in the international system
required a rethinking of the long-sacred "people's war" doctrine, and its derivative "active
defense" strategy The 1985 meeting of the Central Military Committee produced two concepts
which dramaticallv altered PLA doctrine and strategy. While retaining the base terminology, the
CMC's new definitions of "people's war under modern conditions," and "active defense under
new historical conditions," differ significantly from the Maoist concepts. 57
No longer a strictly defensive strategy, "active defense under new historical conditions"
stresses three key elements: first, the initial phase of the war is considered to be decisive; second,
extended strategic depth, both offensive and defensive, is crucial; and third, a modern,
professional military is demanded >x
Though doctrinal changes have taken place throughout the Chinese military, they are
most evident in the PLA Navy (PLAN) The reconceptualization of the naval aspects of this
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strateg\ has centered around the redefinition of two key concepts, offshore and active defense. ?9
The Maoist naval strategy of "offshore active defense" interpreted offshore as meaning essentially
"coastal " The architects of the PLA Navy's "offshore active defense under new historical
conditions" however, view offshore in a very different way. Though not specific in their
definition of offshore. PLA naval leaders typically describe their area of responsibility as the
"territorial seas" of China This vast region encompasses 2.5 million square kilometers of water,
and includes the combined Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of mainland China. Taiwan, and
all the disputed islands "" Similarly, the term "active defense" has taken on new meaning for a
new age Whereas the Maoist "active defense" truly was a defensive strategy, albeit with the
option for offensive tactics, the revised active defense strategy recognizes that modern conditions
may require an offensive strategy to provide the best defense.
In addition to protecting China's "traditional" territorial seas, the PLAN'S current
leadership assert the navy's missions include actions to capture, occupy and defend islands,
protection of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs); coastal defense, and strategic
deterrence "' According to Vice-Commandant Lin Zhiye of the Dalian Naval Vessels Academy,
the PLA Navy has several immediate goals First, the navy needs to develop a larger radius of
action, to include all of the surrounding seas Second, the PLAN should create the force structure
necessarv to maintain sea and air control in a given area Third, the navy should strengthen its
rapid response capability Fourth, the PLAN must enhance its amphibious capabilities. Finally,
the navy must expand and improve its ability to conduct strategic deterrence. 62
Strategy has not been the only aspect of naval doctrine affected by the domestic and
international forces discussed above. Indeed, modernization programs have been a central part
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of the doctrinal transformation that has occurred since 1985 Moreover, the perceived "lessons"
of the Gulf War have had a profound impact on China's grand strategic debate. While rapid
modernization may have been a debatable element of the new naval doctrine prior to the war,
Desert Storm has finally put those arguments to rest. 63 China's national leadership is now firmly
behind the PLAN admirals in insisting that the navy's force structure and weapons systems be
brought up to modern standards, either by indigenous production or, if necessary, by foreign
acquisition Although Beijing may not yet be ready to buy the navy its aircraft carrier, they
probably agree that the PLAN needs one
Current modernization programs are placing emphasis on force structure, infrastructure,
systems, and manpower The PLAN has planned its force structure development in three phases.
By the year 2000 China intends to build a modern navy, whose primary attack forces will consist
of land-based medium range aircraft and attack submarines, while mid-sized surface vessels
equipped with helicopters are to serve as fleet command and protective forces. The second
phase, which should occur between 2000 and 2020. will see PLAN task forces centered around
aircraft carriers, and composed of balanced air. surface, and submarine elements. These task
forces will gradually break away from the West Pacific, and enter oceans around the world.
Finally, beyond the year 2020, the PLAN assumes it capability will be "that of a major sea
power ""4
The perils of an abrupt shift to offensive doctrine, even if for defensive reasons, are plain:
one nation's defensive measures are often seen by another to be threatening, particularly when
those measures involve offensive weapons and strategy. This threat perception prompts a
defensive reaction, which in turn is also seen as threatening. Repeating over and over again, this
cyclical phenomenon is known as the security dilemma Security dilemmas can often result in




misperceptions might lead to war In a region characterized by historic suspicion, hostility, and
tension, a "cult of the offensive." and the security dilemma in which it results, can only signal
danger on the horizon
The intent of this chapter has not been to create a new Northeast Asian bogeyman, or to
argue that the region is as dangerous as it was during the height of the Cold War Indeed, the end
of superpower confrontation in Northeast Asia has probably reduced the danger of great power
hostilities, and certaink lessened the possibility of a nuclear exchange The post-Cold War
regional security environment, however, is by no means benign
The relatively stable bipolar structure that characterized Northeast Asia during the Cold
War has been superseded by a multipolar system Moreover, several systemic and domestic
factors suggest that the principal U S interests in Northeast Asia—maintaining stability, and
preventing the rise of a regional hegemon—are still faced with very real threats. The central
question now becomes how US grand strategy should compensate for this multipolar
environment and protect America's fundamental interests, in the face of powerful domestic and
international pressures to retrench In the next chapter, this thesis contends that U.S. policy-
makers have, so far. failed to adequately address this dilemma
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IV. THE FAILURE OF POST-COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY
Above all else, the security environment that now prevails in Northeast Asia must
be characterized as uncertain. Without question, the United States has many vital interests
at stake in the region, and there is no doubt that a multitude of dangers to those interests
exists. The task that now faces America's security planners is to construct a coherent and
viable grand strategy for the post-Cold War era: a strategy that can ensure U.S. interests
in Northeast Asia at a cost that is acceptable to the American people. In this monumental
task U.S. policy-makers have thus far been unsuccessful. The objective of this chapter is
to describe the direction national security policy has taken since the end of the Cold War,
and explain why these new directions are unsuitable for protecting America's interests in
post-Cold War Northeast Asia.
Rather than debate the details of the Bush and Clinton national security strategies,
or delve into the specific Northeast Asian "doctrines" of the State and Defense
Departments, this chapter considers the character of post-Cold War grand strategy in the
broadest sense. Although grand strategy is typically defined as possessing political,
military and economic aspects, at this high level of analysis, these distinctions tend to blur.
Rather than perpetuate artificial divisions, this thesis examines the overall direction of U.S.
security policy in the form of four general precepts which define post-Cold War grand
strategy. Furthermore, while economic policy is not addressed specifically, there are
many aspects of political and military policy which relate to the economic aspects of grand
strategy.
Beginning with the Bush national security strategy of August, 1990, U.S. defense
planners have attempted to revise American grand strategy for the post-Cold War era.
Follow-on works, such as the 1991-1992 National Security Strategy, written in the wake
of the Gulf War, and the 1992 Department of Defense report to Congress, A Strategic
Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, expanded and clarified the administration's approach
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to grand strategy. Central to the Bush strategy for securing U.S. interests in Northeast
Asia were the fundamental Cold War concepts of forward presence and the maintenance
of bilateral security arrangements. Additionally, the Bush administration introduced the
phrase "New World Order" in reference to a post-Cold War world in which America, by
virtue of its political, military, and economic preeminence, would serve as "catalyst and
consciousness-raiser" in a system of increasingly interdependent states. "This approach
assumes that with capitalism and democracy triumphant throughout the globe, like-minded
national leaders can now frame collective solutions to fundamental international problems
more easily than in the past."
05
The national security policies of the Clinton administration, both in theory and
practice, differ little from those promulgated under Bush. Aside from placing greater
emphasis on economic security and "promoting democracy" abroad, A National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (July 1994) is premised on the same set of
concepts that formed the Bush strategy: U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic
preeminence; forward presence: collective security; and bilateral security arrangements.
The balance of this chapter will examine each of these four precepts, and will argue that
while it may be unwise to suddenly abandon them, a U.S. grand strategy that is founded
on them is likely, in the long-term, to fail.
A. THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF PREEMINENCE
Despite the realities of the emerging multipolar regional environment discussed in
Chapter III, U.S. national security strategy has thus far failed to consider a context in
which U.S. primacy is unsustainable. The foreign and defense policies of the Bush and
Clinton administrations have not only been premised on unipolarity, but have suggested
Goldbers "Selective Eneauement" 15-16
strategies aimed at preventing or discouraging other great powers from "even aspiring to
a larger regional or global role."
60 Christopher Layne, in his article "The Unipolar
Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise." presents a comprehensive argument—based
on structural realist theory and historical example—against this U.S. grand-strategic
assumption. In describing this flawed strategy. Layne states:
This strategy is not overtly aggressive; the use ofpreventive measures to
suppress the emergence ofnew great powers is not contemplated. It is not,
in other words, a strategy of heavy-handed American dominance. Rather
the strategy ofpreponderance seeks to preserve unipolarity by persuading
Japan and Germany tliat they are better offremaining within the orbit of an
American-led security and economic system than they would be if they
became great powers. 6 '
Layne begins his argument with the premise that states balance against hegemons,
e\en those "that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more
on benevolence than coercion." Furthermore, from his examination of similar historic
periods and struoural realist theory. Layne concludes that unipolarity is inherently unstable
primarily for two reasons: first, unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own destruction
because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the
emergence of new great powers: and second, the entry of new great powers into the
international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its
preeminence. 68 Layne expresses his conclusions succinctly:
""
Initial draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for FY 1994-99 and
leaked to the New York Times. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent Re-emergence of a
\ew Rival'." New York Times. 8 Mar 1992: A14 and, Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls
for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, 8 Mar 1992: Al. Cited in Christopher Layne.
"The Unipolar Illusion Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security Spring 1993:
5-6
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Inevitably, a strategy ofpreponderance will fail. A strategy of more or less
benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence ofnew great powers. The
fate of nineteenth-century Britain, which followed such a strategy, is
illustrative. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride
militarily and economically. Over time, the effect is to erode the hegemon 's
preeminence. A hegemon tends to overpay for security, which eventually
weakens the internal foundation of its external position. Other states
underpayfor security, which allows them to shift additional resources into
economically productive investments. Moreover, benign hegemony
facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. As a
consequence, differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic
power that ultimately result in the emergence ofnew great powers.
69
Applied to Northeast Asia. Layne's argument may serve as a warning that not only
is sustained preeminence unlikely, but a grand strategy that seeks to guarantee U.S.
primacy may actually accelerate the decline of America's position. In the geo-political
maneuverings of China can be seen a nation motivated by the fear of American hegemony.
Though it is possible that any U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia short of total disengagement
may be seen as provocative in Beijing, it is probable that China's leaders perceive
hegemonic ambition in American proclamations of a "New World Order" and democratic
enlargement.
Unquestionably, America has paid more for security in Northeast Asia than any of
its current allies. While this investment may have been easily justified during the Cold
War. it is possible that the United States is now overpaying. Having assumed primary
responsibility for the defense of Japan and South Korea—and the rest of Northeast Asia
from the threat of renewed Japanese militarism—the United States has placed itself in an
unenviable position. While America expends its precious resources ensuring regional
stability, economically sound Northeast Asian nations are, in fact, "free-riding" militarily
and. to some degree, economically. This American shield is now allowing Japan and
'" Lavne "Unipolar Illusion" 34
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South Korea, two nations who could afford to bear more of the regional defense burden,
to invest a greater portion of their available capital in productive ventures.
America's "benign hegemony" has also allowed China the benefit of a relatively
peaceful environment in which to construct and modernize a market economy. Similarly,
the open nature of the trading structure built on U.S. assurances has facilitated the
diffusion of American wealth and technology to all the nations of Northeast Asia.
In the end. it is only the results that matter. The astounding economic growth rates
of nearly every nation in East Asia should provide clear warning that a U.S. grand strategy
that assumes sustainable preeminence is bound to fail. As the economic power of the
nations o\~ Northeast Asia continues to gain in relation to American strength, a U.S.
attempt to maintain its relative political and military position may prove disastrous, further
skewing the strategic balance, and exasperating crucial domestic problems. 70
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For an interesting discussion of a failed grand strategy for managing relative decline, see
.1 H Elliot. "Managing Decline Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain," Grand
Strategies in War and Peace, ed Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale. 1991): 87-104. Elliot
recounts the failure of Spanish policy in the first half of the seventeenth century Though the
Spanish monarchy had once reigned supreme in the world, military setbacks and financial
difficulties had diminished its ability to compete with modernizing powers such as Britain and
France Countduke Olivares. like many of his contemporaries, believed Spain's decline could only
be reversed by a return to the moral highground she had once claimed. Olivares embarked on a
policy, not of managing decline, but of restoring greatness. The goal of Spanish grand strategy
became to reinitiate a war that "would at once purify and reinvigorate Castile and restore the king
of Spain to his proper, and God-assigned position as the greatest monarch in the world." Instead
of disengaging, Spain's new 'Union of Arms' redoubled its military efforts in the Spanish
Netherlands. Italy and later France The strain on the monarchy's kingdoms and provinces
brought about by these conflicts imminently resulted in critical uprisings in Catalonia and
Portugal, and the further demise of Imperial Spain
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B. THE DIFFICULTIES OF FORWARD PRESENCE
As with U.S. preeminence, the centrality of forward military presence to Northeast
Asian grand strategy may provide short-term benefits, but in the long-run may be
untenable. There are several arguments to justify this position. First, the changing nature
of statehood in Northeast Asia might pull the welcome mat out from under U.S. troops.
Although most contemporary policy-makers in both Japan and South Korea support the
forward deployment of U.S. forces, this situation has already shown signs of change. One
reason is the transformation of the regional security environment. Without the perception
that their very survival is being threatened by the communist giants and their proxies,
opinion-shapers in Japan and South Korea may soon begin to question the need for U.S.
troops on their soil.
Contributing to this reexamination of Cold War security arrangements is the
phenomenal economic growth experienced by both Japan and South Korea, and the
impetus this growth has provided for these nations to act more like "normal" powers. No
longer content to influence regional events in the economic realm alone, many Japanese
and Koreans want to see their nations secure a larger political and military role. Given a
larger role. Northeast Asians may come to view a force structure that is directly tied to
U.S. military strategy and posture as a compromise of their own sovereignty and an
impediment to independent action. Moreover, a growing number of regional policy-
makers fear that America, itself no longer constrained by the immediacy of the Soviet
threat, will increasingly use its role as sole-guarantor of regional security to gain leverage
in other, non-security matters. Japan's contentious negotiations with the United States
over trade issues provides one example. 71
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A second factor that may work against continued forward presence is domestic
opinion in the United States. Despite the assurances of American military planners that
keeping U.S. troops deployed in Japan is actually cheaper than bringing them home, the
current national preoccupation with domestic issues could eventually result in strong
pressure to retrench. As Americans struggle with crime, drugs, poverty, healthcare and
other pressing concerns, convincing them that American troops should remain in Asia to
protect wealthy Japanese and Koreans from an ambiguous threat, or even worse. Asians
from the Japanese, will become more difficult. While the Cold War provided the
American people with a clear ideological foe. the post-Cold War era. as yet, does not.
Although it may be possible to persuade the U.S. public that America should remain
engaged in Northeast Asia, and that it should retain the military capability to project power
into the region, this is an entirely different matter than maintaining 75.000 troops in Japan
and Korea. 72
A third reason why the future of forward presence may be uncertain is the
questionable military significance of those forces. As the U.S. defense budget declines
and military planners are asked to do more with less, it will become increasingly important
that available forces be both flexible and extremely effective. The current American
military posture in the region holds more political than military significance. U.S. troops
in Japan, rather than serving to protect the Japanese homeland from attack, now have more
value as a safeguard against aggressive Japanese rearmament, and the possibility of a
destabilizing regional arms race. Similarly, while U.S. forces still provide important C3I
and infrastructure capabilities to South Korean defense, the primary purpose of the U.S.
Army's 2nd Division is to serve as a tripwire for guaranteed American intervention. In
the region as a whole. U.S. forces matter less as an influence on the local balance of
power than as a reaffirmation to Asians that America intends to remain engaged. While
: A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim 22.
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this reaffirmation is important, there are alternative strategies that would prove more
flexible and cost-efficient. As political circumstances continue to evolve, these missions
may become badly out of step with reality. Consequently, U.S. forces, without either a
political or military role could become a strategic anachronism. Over-stretched, the armed
forces of the United States will not be able to allow such a large portion of its available
force to be relegated to strategic insignificance:
There are of course costs associated with forward deployment. Flexibility
is sacrificed. Units earmarked for a particular region or theater cannot
easily be committed to deal with a contingency elsewhere. As the particular
scenarios for which we have planned over the last forty years become less
probable, force planners will have to seriously reevaluate many aspects of
forward deployment. 73
Finally, forward presence limits American grand strategy by seemingly obligating
the United States to defend certain nations with no precondition of reciprocity. In the
emerging multipolar regional system, coalitions and alignments are likely to be more
ephemeral than during the relatively predictable Cold War era. This fluidity in Northeast
Asian politics will require a grand strategy whose political and military elements are able
to adjust and compensate for the changing environment. By maintaining large units on
foreign soil, the United States is, in effect, committing itself to binding, long-term
obligations. Although the sudden withdrawal of American forces from Japan and Korea
could have undesirable results, a long-term national defense strategy that is premised on
forward presence is not only unsustainable, but could have the effect of limiting U.S.
options and flexibility.
'y Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty," Strategic Review
Spring 1990 13
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C. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
The variety of collective security referred to in this Section describes the type of
policies promulgated by the Bush administration under the rubric of "New World Order."
and by the Clinton administration as "democratic enlargement." Though these policies
have significant differences, they possess one fundamental commonality: they both
envision a world in which democratic, market-oriented, peace-loving nations, under the
benevolent leadership of the United States, will unite against pariah-states to maintain the
status quo. There are several reasons to doubt this optimistic scenario.
First and foremost, collective security schemes often fail because "polities will not
pay high costs to advance interests other than their own." 74 The proponents of collective
security believe in the viability of such a system because they assume that states share a
number of common interests. The reality, however, is that while states may have some
objectives in common, by and large they are guided by their own unique set of interests.
President Bush may have patterned his vision of a "New World Order" on the coalition-
building that enabled victory in the Gulf War. but instances of such international consensus
are rare. Consequently, giving collective security a central role in U.S. grand strategy
only serves to mislead Americans into believing the United States will always be able to
assemble and lead a preponderant coalition to protect their interests.
The Clinton administration's proposition that America's security can be improved
by a policy of democratic enlargement presents similar problems. The rationale behind
democratic enlargement is the hypothesis that democracies are less likely to fight one
another, and furthermore, that a world community of democratic nations would bind
together in the face of a common threat (collective security). Although few would
disagree with the supposition that a world of democratic nations would be safer than a
Gray "Strategic Sense" 12
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world of authoritarian states, there are no guarantees.
75
Moreover, form of government
notwithstanding, states will still perceive, advance and defend their own set of objectives.
Other than a vague sense of a more peaceful environment, democratic enlargement does
not serve to advance American interests vis-a-vis states who feel their own interests are
threatened.
America's leadership role in democratic enlargement is even more problematic to
grand strategy. Although it may be in the national interest to encourage and support
democracy when possible, elevating enlargement from a goal to a primary tool of foreign
and defense policy is bound to create tensions. While human rights may be a universal
value, democracy is not. Espousing the spread of democratic government once again sets
the United States in the position of the ideological crusader, determined to reshape the
world in its image. This assault from the moral high ground will not play well in
culturally unique Northeast Asia. Aggressive enlargement places the United States on a
collision course with China and North Korea, thus limiting the flexibility of U.S. security
strategy in a region characterized by uncertainty and change. Additionally, a strategy of
active enlargement suggests tactics of frequent intervention. If recent U.S. experiences
in Lebanon. Grenada. Panama. Somalia and Haiti are any indication, the American people
may grow weary of paying high costs in the name of abstract ideology. A grand strategy
rooted in enlargement, and thus interventionism, would thus become untenable.
D. THE U.S. BILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA
At the very heart of U.S. grand strategy in post-Cold War Northeast Asia is the
maintenance of post-World War II bilateral security arrangements. One does not have to
' For an argument against the proposition that democracies do not fight each other, see
Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security
Fall 1904 5-49
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read far into the national security strategies of Presidents Bush and Clinton, or the strategy
and planning documents of the Departments of State and Defense to realize that this system
remains central to American policy. But is this structure still viable in today's dynamic,
multipolar regional environment? There are several reasons to question the feasibility, and
even desirability of this policy.
An argument can be made that, as a result of the monumental changes that have
taken place in the regional structure and security environment, contingencies could arise
in which the United States will either be unable to maintain its current bilateral security
relationships, or in which the continuation of those relationships would result in a
destabilizing tilt in the regional balance of power. The emergence of a dangerous
imbalance in Northeast Asia would almost certainly have a detrimental influence on vital
U.S. national interests. Rather than clinging blindly to outdated Cold War structures,
American grand strategy should reflect the reality that the day may soon come when
bilateral arrangements with Japan and South Korea are no longer possible. Discussed
below are four contingencies that could mandate a redirection of U.S. grand strategy, and
a divestment of bilateral security ties.
1. Japan becomes a "normal" power:
Although there is still widespread opposition in Japan to an enlarged military role,
there appears to be an emerging consensus that Japan should play a larger part in
international affairs. The end of the Cold War and the increased salience of regional issues
have prompted many political elites to question Japan's post-war abstention from Northeast
Asian politics. "There is a growing inclination to play an active role in world affairs, in
spite of the supposed constitutional restrictions on the use of military force." 76
Ted Galen Carpenter, in his book A Search For Enemies: America's Alliances after
tlie Cold War. points to a number of indications that Tokyo is seeking a less dependent (on
76
Ted Galen Carpenter. A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War
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the United States) role. Among them he lists: an aggressive foreign aid program; a
growing national defense intelligence structure: overtures to Southeast Asian nations
concerning a regional security dialogue: and plans to acquire and store plutonium.
Taken individually or collectively, those developments do not prove that
Japan has embarked on a concerted effort to develop an assertive political
or military posture. They do, however, suggest that Japan seems to be
hedging its bets. An independent intelligence apparatus, for example, is a
crucial prerequisite for an independent security strategy. Similarly, a
stockpile of plutonium gives Japan the option of developing a nuclear
weapons arsenal if the political leadership subsequently decides that the
U. S. nuclear shield is no longer reliable or that the U. S. -Japanese alliance
is no longer in the country's best interests. Vie underlying reason for
Tokyo's recent actions appear to be a questfor more options in the security
realm.
"
The end of the Cold War has not created a more favorable security context for
Japanese strategic planners. In fact, many of Japan's leaders have voiced concern that the
"new world order" may be more dangerous than the old, primarily due to instability.
Other concerns include: China's growing maritime interests and capabilities; still-potent
Russian nationalism: a power-vacuum and possible Chinese hegemony in the South China
Sea; and North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Japan's specific maritime
concerns in the South China Sea are that a Chinese bid for hegemony, or tensions created
by the rapid growth of Southeast Asian navies could lead to isolated or general conflict,
and disrupt SLOCs vital to Japan's survival. Much like China, Japan's changing security
concerns indicates a shift in focus from global balances of power, to regional hotspots. 78
Another indication of the level of change being debated in Japanese strategic circles
is the recent report issued by the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense Issues
7
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(AGDI). The group's recommendations, published on August 12, 1994, in a Tokyo
newspaper, were presented to the Prime Minister, and will be considered in an upcoming
review of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline.
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Although the group's members
were chosen by the previous prime minister, and its suggestions are not likely to be
implemented by the new SDP-LDP coalition, the mere fact that such revolutionary
proposals could be made by a high-level advisory group attests to the depth of Japan's
strategic debate.
The essence of the AGDI report is a recommendation that Japan "move away from
a passive defense strategy to a more integrated one in keeping with changes in the
geopolitical situation."
80 The report includes many specific proposals for the SDF. which
it argues should be trimmed down to a 240.000- strong, multi-functional, highly mobile
force. While the AGDI stresses the importance of continued bilateral security ties to the
United States, much of the report seems based on the premise that Japan must change its
post-World War Two defense strategy to allow for increased international cooperation on
the pan of the SDF.
At the core of the group's recommendations for the Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force (JMSDF) is the conviction that the fleet should become more balanced.
Additionally, the report contends that the Air Self-Defense Forces should reduce its large
number of interceptors, and concentrate on refueling, early-warning, and long-range
transport aircraft. Finally, on a national scale, the AGDI urges Tokyo to dramatically










The deptli and substance of this strategic debate suggest that Japanese policy-makers
are no longer confident of their security relationship with the United States. This
uncertainty may spring from the belief that, without the unifying threat of the Soviet
Union, U.S. -Japanese differences on contentious issues—such as trade— will tear the
alliance asunder. Despite the popularity of economic liberalism in Japan, another
contributor may be a resurgence of realism in the Japanese world view. As a consequence
of its renewed involvement in regional affairs, Tokyo may be discovering that Japan has
a unique set of national interests, quite distinct from those of the United States. As an
important world power and potential regional leader, Japan may not long remain content
to rely on the U.S. to defend its vital interests. Moreover, many Japanese believe the U.S.
is intentionally trying to "keep Japan a second-rate political and military power," and
intends to "impose a Pax Americana in which the United States 'calls the shots' and other
countries are forced to follow." 82 Japan may soon come to the conclusion that only by
altering or dissolving its subordinate political-military relationship with the U.S. will it be
able to act independently, and in a manner commensurate with its perceived international
position.
2. China grows; Japan remains constrained:
Although a resurgent Japan may be beyond the control of the United States, this
may be preferable to other alternatives. The astounding economic growth potential of
China presents another serious challenge to an American grand strategy rooted in Cold
War-ear bilateral relationships. Even with only moderate economic growth, China's
demographics should give planners cause to take notice. Chalmers Johnson notes:
In 1989, Cliina had a per capita income of $547, or 2.6 percent of that of
the United States; and a total GNP of $603.5 billion, or 11.6 percent of
ours. China 's population of 1.1 billion people is more than four times that
of the U.S. Tliese numbers mean that China couldfairly easily produce an
economy the same size as the United States ' while still having a relatively
x2 Carpenter A Search for Enemies 65.
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low per capita income. If China achieved a per capita GNP even one-
fourth that of the United States-approximately the level of Korea's today-it
would have an absolute GNP greater than that of the United States. With
the high growth and savings rates achieved in recent years, matching the
per capita income of South Korea today is not an unrealistic goal for
China. v
A geo-politically-minded China would most likely endeavor to parlay this economic
strength into political and military power as well. Certainly there are many Beijing elites
who believe China is the natural leader of Northeast Asia. The authoritarian nature of
China's government, and its historical and cultural past, will undoubtedly raise concerns
in the region that this leadership could eventually assume hegemonic form. This potential
creates dire problems for a U.S. national security strategy that seeks to prevent or counter
the growth of a regional hegemon.
Who would balance against a regionally powerful China? Russia is likely to remain
weak well into the next century, and though she still possesses a powerful strategic nuclear
arsenal. Moscow's ineffective conventional force and lack of regional economic clout
makes her value as a balancer questionable. Moreover, Moscow's recent relations with
Beijing suggest the beginnings a political and military alignment that could further upset
the regional balance. This would leave only Japan. South Korea and the United States to
ensure a stable distribution of power. Herein lies the dilemma: constrained by their
subordinate political-military relationships with the United States, Japan and Korea would
be unable to contribute significantly to the regional balance of power.
In essence. U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia has been, and still is a policy of
dual containment. In the post-World War II era. the United States endeavored not only
to contain the Soviet Union, but also to prevent the resurgence of German and Japanese
militarism. Although America is no longer protecting Europe from the Germans, it
continues to defend Asia from the Japanese.
K1 Chalmers Johnson. "Rethinking Asia," The National Interest Summer 1993: 23.
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By perpetuating policies that discourage Tokyo from becoming a "normal" great
power, the United States is virtually guaranteeing Japan's inability to serve as an effective
balancer, and China's ascendancy to regional leadership. Consequently, in the event of
a bid for hegemony, or a destabilizing imbalance favoring China, the United States would
bear a disproportionate military and political burden to restore equilibrium. In a region
characterized by dynamic, modern economies, this is an unnecessary burden, and is not
a policy America can afford to maintain.
3. Reunification on the Korean Peninsula:
Finally, the reunification of the Koreas would most likely obviate the need for U.S.
troops in that region. While some South Korean officials have already expressed an
interest in retaining U.S. forces in Korea following reunification. U.S. defense planners
would find it difficult to justify such an action. 84
The three scenarios discussed above represent situations in which the United States
might be forced to rethink its reliance on bilateral security arrangements. But even if
Japan does not become a normal power. China does not make a bid for regional
hegemony, and the Koreas do not reunify, the United States should closely examine the
"fit" of its current grand strategy with the prevailing regional security climate. The
bottom-line is that American post-Cold War national security policy more closely reflects
the realities of the Cold War than the current era. A grand strategy that is rooted in
forward presence and bilateral security arrangements is neither cost-efficient nor
sufficiently flexible for contemporary conditions. Furthermore, the addition of the
concepts of collective security and democratic enlargement to American security dogma
does not update grand strategy, but rather, renders it more problematic.
Thus far this thesis has illustrated the uncertain and dangerous environment that is
emerging in Northeast Asia, and argued that current U.S. grand strategy is ill-suited to
x4
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serve America's regional security interests. The balance of this thesis examines the
political, military, and economic aspects of an alternative grand strategy for Northeast
Asia, as well as the special problems presented by Japan, and possible solutions.
53
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V. THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY
"He who attempts to defend too much defends nothing. " Frederick the Great
The role of foreign policy is crucial to a complete grand strategy. In fact, a grand
strategy, if applied effectively, "alleviates any need for violence." 85 In a world of
decreasing military budgets and increasing international economic competition, diplomacy
plays a vital role by managing trade, easing tensions, responding to crises, ending conflict,
and shaping the character of the international environment in which national strategy must
operate. As the Japanese and Russians have discovered, security is not simply military,
but has political and economic dimensions that, if neglected, will surely bring about the
failure of any grand design.
The fundamental objective of foreign policy in a grand strategy of selective
engagement is twofold. First, diplomacy would strive to shape the international strategic
environment by keeping the United States actively engaged in world politics. Second,
foreign policy would endeavor to maintain geo-political balances that would ensure
stability in the world marketplace and create a climate in which progress can be made
toward the betterment of the human condition.
To best facilitate America's national security interests in a region characterized by
tension and uncertainty. U.S. foreign policy needs a strategic rationale. Charles William
Maynes. editor of Foreign Policy, argues that U.S. leadership needs a "geopolitical
yardstick" to act as guide and midpoint for a post-Cold War foreign policy that is pulled
between the extremes of global preeminence and traditional isolationism. 86 In order to
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formulate objectives that will operationalize these abstractions. In Chapter II, this thesis
examined U.S. security interests, and determined that America's most important objectives
in Northeast Asia were the maintenance of stability, and the forestallment of regional
hegemons. This chapter argues that the diplomatic aspects of post-Cold War grand
strategy can best serve U.S. security interests and objectives through three tactics: first,
by de-emphasizing binding bilateral security arrangements; second, by placing America
in the position of engaged balancer and grand facilitator; and third, by encouraging a
gradual shift of Northeast Asian security responsibilities to Asia. Fundamental to these
approaches is an underlying belief that geo-politics and the balance of power still matter
in Northeast Asia.
A. A PREMATURE FUNERAL FOR GEO-POLITICS
Whether a realist international system, in which balances of power operate, still
exists is a matter of heated contemporary debate. "A number of lines of thought now
converge to suggest that the relationships among the major powers have entered an entirely
new phase in which, contrary to all past experience and to the logic of the anarchic
international system as it has been generally understood, war is no longer an option for
those powers in their relations with one another." 87 James Richardson in his essay, "The
End of Geopolitics?." summarizes some of the arguments typically advanced in support
of this perspective. First, an increase in the number of democratic states has lessened the
possibility of war because democracies are less likely to use military force against one
another. Second, the new form of global economic interdependence is of a different order
than the old interdependence which failed to prevent major war. Third, great powers no
longer engage in geopolitical rivalries, but instead are required to cooperate in order to
* 7 James L Richardson, "The End of Geopolitics?," Charting the Post-Cold War Order,
eds Richard Leaver and James L Richardson (Boulder: Westview, 1993) 40.
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maintain the complex global economy. Fourth, there has been a secular change of
attitudes in the democratic societies amounting to a rejection of major war (non-nuclear)
as an instrument of policy.
88
Though not without merit, the arguments in support of the liberal paradigm are not
entirely convincing when viewed in the context of Northeast Asia. First, the notion of
democratic peace does not provide much reassurance in a region with only one stable
democracy-Japan. While Russia is presently experimenting with democratic institutions,
the tumultuous domestic situation could eventually produce a decidedly non-democratic
government. Even South Korea, which for now appears to be on the road to real
democracy, could revert to more authoritarian forms if pressed with the enormous task of
reconstructing the North.
89
The second argument for the demise of geo-politics runs into similar trouble in
Northeast Asia. As discussed in Chapter HI. economic interdependence in the region is
not comparable to the sort of interdependence evident in Western Europe and North
America. Economic interdependence in Northeast Asia has not only failed to keep pace
with the European Union, but it also varies greatly within the region, and even within
individual states. Moreover, there is little historical evidence to support the proposition
that economic interdependence can ameliorate tension and conflict. 90
The third argument-that states must now cooperate to maintain the complex global
economy, and therefore no longer engage in geo-political rivalries—holds some truth, but
is not entirely acceptable. Indeed the world economy, and that of Northeast Asia, is
complex, and cooperation among states contributes to its efficient operation. President
** Richardson "The End of Geopolitics 17 " 40.
I<J Edward A Olsen. lecture. Security in Asia Seminar, Naval Postgraduate School, 24
Oct 1994
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Clinton's de-linking of human rights and Most Favored Nation trade status may be one
example of this type of accordance. Sovereign states, however, do not always agree on
the proper course of action in regard to international economics. Just as groups within
states differ on policy, states within a system can arrive at diametrically opposed positions,
even when their interests coincide. These differences, particularly during periods of
economic stress, could lead to tension, and even conflict.
Additionally, there is no reason to believe that cooperation for the sake of mutual
economic benefit rules out geo-political maneuvering. Trade cooperation between the
United States and China continued throughout the Bush Administration, despite the
conviction held in Beijing that America was attempting to impose its hegemony on the
post-Cold War world." 1 Not surprisingly. China has continued to act geo-politically, as
its military cooperation with Russia and proclamations regarding maritime territories
demonstrate.
Finally, there is insufficient empirical evidence that modern societies have rejected
major war (non-nuclear) as an instrument of policy. Although this argument may hold
some validity for Japan, it is probably not sound in regard to China, Russia or the Koreas.
Even the modern, well-informed citizens of the United States were overwhelmingly
prepared to spend thousands of American lives to restore the Emir of Kuwait, and
safeguard oil primarily destined for Japan and Europe.
The revolutionary changes beginning to appear in the political landscape of Western
Europe give credence to the optimism of post-modern liberalism. The realities of
Northeast Asia, however, suggest that it may be premature to dance on the grave of geo-
politics. Even those who herald the demise of balance of power politics among the "core"
states (meaning Europe, North America and Japan) harbor reservations about international
relations in the "periphery." Richardson qualifies his hypothesis:
'J] Shambaugh "Growing Strong" 49-50.
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The end of geopolitics, then-taking this to mean the end of war among the
leading powers and ofarming themselves against one another— is plausible
as a projection of the next phase of international politics. However, a
challenge to the dominant order by a major 'liave-not' power cannot be
entirely ruled out, even though this is more easily envisaged in regional
terms than in global terms—and China is the power most likely to be in a
position to mount such a challenge. y2
B. THE BALANCE OF POWER
If geo-politics are not dead in Northeast Asia, then American grand strategy should
contain diplomatic elements that recognize and accommodate for these realities. Although
U.S. grand strategy should not abandon the hope of achieving Northeast Asian security
objectives through more liberal methods—such as the expansion of democracy and free
market economies, and the institutionalization of multilateral security cooperation— its
foundation should be rooted in the clay of "existential realism." 93 Accepting this reality,
one of the most cost-effective diplomatic methods through which the United States can
achieve its national security objectives is the maintenance of a regional balance of power.
The balance of power has come to represent the primary diplomatic strategy of
states in a realist geo-political system. Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, David
Hume argued that man had been thinking in terms of the balance of power since at least
the times of Thucydides. and asserted, "the maxim of preserving the balance of power is
founded so much in common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could
have altogether escaped antiquity. . ." More modern elucidations on the merits of this
°
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concept have been penned by such giants in the field of international relations as Hans
Morgenthau. Inis Claude, and Henry Kissinger.
The fundamental precept of the balance of power theory is that states, which are
the primary actors in any realist paradigm, will seek cooperative arrangements with other
states to safeguard or advance their interests vis-a-vis an opposing state or alignment.
"The safety of all was assured only if no one nation or group of nations was permitted to
achieve a preponderance of power. . . whenever the system threatened to break down, a
balancer' would ally itself with the weaker group of nations and thus restore the unstable
equilibrium known as the 'balance of power. ",q4
Stephen Walt, in "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," examines
the most central debate concerning the paradigm's theoretical soundness:
Wlien entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to
the principle source ofdanger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses
the major threat). These contrasting hypotheses depict very different
worlds, and the policies that followfrom each are equally distinct. In the
simplest terms, if balancing is more common than bandwagoning , then
states are more secure because aggressors willface combined opposition.
Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions
by eschewing threatening foreign and defense policies. But if
bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, then security is scarce because
aggression is rewarded. A more belligerent foreign policy and a more
capable military establishment are the logical policy choices. 9S
Walt goes on to make a convincing argument that, despite some notable exceptions rooted
in factors such as perceived threat, proximity, and ideology, balancing is the prevalent
reaction in international alliance-building.
74 John G Stoessinger, The Might ofNations: World Politics in Our Time, 8th ed. (New
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Another prominent thinker in the field of international relations. Morton Kaplan,
maintains that a balance of power operates by several essential rules, which constitute the
characteristic behavior of the system. These rules include:
• oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of
predominance within the system;
• permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the
system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously
inessential actor within the essential actor classification; and
• treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.
96
Viewed in the context of post-Cold war Northeast Asia, these "rules" can provide
direction for a U.S. diplomacy that acknowledges existential realism. First, the political
elements of U.S. grand strategy should focus on maintaining a power equilibrium by
opposing nations that seek predominance. Though many observers would immediately
point to the threat from China, it is not yet evident that Beijing wishes to impose its
hegemony on Northeast Asia. U.S. policy-makers should also guard against letting
ideological affinity cloud strategic judgment when faced with hegemonic ambition.
American diplomacy should be just as ready to balance against a dominating Japan or
Russia. Winston Churchill's words illustrate this point:
Vie policy ofEngland takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the
overlordship of Europe. It is concerned solely with whoever is the
strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. It is a law ofpublic policy
which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental
circumstances of likes and dislikes. . .
9?
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Second. U.S. foreign policy should work to facilitate the reentry of Russia, the heir
to the defeated Soviet Union, into the regional power balance. By encouraging the
rebuilding of effective government in Russia, and allowing that state to participate as a full
partner in the international system, the United States would serve its Northeast Asian
security interests by contributing to regional equilibrium. Similarly, American diplomacy
should work toward the integration of both North and South Korea—and someday a unified
Korea- into the Northeast Asian balance as full partners, rather than the junior partners
of the great powers. It is very possible that Korea may one day play a pivotal role in the
regional balance of power. In fact. Chalmers Johnson refers to Korea, along with
Vietnam, as the "most important buffer states in East Asia." 98
Finally. American foreign policy should regard all of Northeast Asia's essential
actors as acceptable role partners: North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and most
importantly. China. While U.S. anti-China rhetoric has cooled somewhat, American
proclamations and policies elsewhere in Asia continue to give the impression of a nation
locked in an ideological duel. America cannot afford to isolate or contain China, nor
should it try. "To put it bluntly, with some 22 percent of the world's population, a seat
on the U.N. Security Council, a nuclear and missile arsenal with global reach, and, by
some measures, the world's third largest economy, if China is not integrated into a post-
Cold War system, a viable international system will not exist." 99 A stable and effective
China would play a crucial role in a healthy Northeast Asian balance of power; a weak
China "could once again become an object of international competition and stimulate
rivalries that would make regional cooperation an idle dream." 100
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With these general directions suggested by balance of power theory in mind,
specific national security roles for U.S. diplomacy in post-Cold War Northeast Asia can
now be examined.
C. TOWARD MORE FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS
The collection of bilateral arrangements that has characterized American security
policy in post-World War II Northeast Asia has served U.S. interests well. Particularly
in Northeast Asia, where security treaties with Japan and South Korea have dominated the
political landscape, these bilateral arrangements have enabled the United States not only
to contain Soviet expansionism, but also to spread American ideals and structures, thereby
creating an Asia-Pacific environment favorable to its interests. The Cold War and the
circumstances that created it. however, are no more. In spite of these monumental
changes. U.S. security policy seems intent on allowing inertia to carry it into the twenty-
first century.
Whereas the conditions that spawned containment required a structure of rigid
bilateral security pacts, the evolving nature of post-Cold War Northeast Asia may be better
served through more flexible arrangements. As discussed in Chapter IV. regional events
such as Japan's transition to normal power status. China's continued growth, or the
reunification of Korea may force an end to current security relationships. Additionally,
an overly ambitious diplomatic agenda and pressing domestic concerns in the United States
could result in a rising nostalgia for traditional American isolationism. These possibilities
should alert U.S. strategic planners to the need to begin searching for alternative practices.
By gradually transforming America's rigid security relationships with Japan and
Korea into less binding arrangements, the United States could give itself more latitude to
maneuver in a balance of power environment, while preventing the instability that might
result from a hastily unleashed Japan (the Japan issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter
VI). This process would allow the United States to progress from its expensive and
exhausting role as protector of Northeast Asian stability to that of a participant in the
regional balance of power.
D. AMERICA AS BALANCER AND GRAND FACILITATOR
Rather than responding to perceived threats to U.S. strategic interests within the
framework of America's Cold War security arrangements, the diplomacy of a grand
strategy of selective engagement would allow more latitude. By first clearly identifying
U.S. security interests, and then examining each threat to those interests on an ad hoc
basis, the United States would, in effect, be applying a policy of selective engagement.
Andrew Goldberg argues that selective engagement is not new to American foreign
policy, and is in many ways similar to the nineteenth century policies of Great Britain,
another maritime power. Goldberg describes the historical attributes of such a policy:
The first characteristic of selective engagement was to rely upon and if
possible nurture a relatively equal balance ofpower among other states.
The second was the avoidance ofpermanent military commitments on other
continents. The t/iird was an emphasis on maritime strength and eventually
air power to provide comparative military advantage andfreedom of action
in the event of hostilities.
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Accordingly, a U.S. security policy employing the principles of selective
engagement would contain three key elements: first, U.S. foreign policy would seek to
nurture a relative balance of power among the major states of Eurasia. Second, while
embracing international organizations and coalitions whenever possible, the United States
would eschew most permanent military commitments in favor of more flexible




preponderance as an alternative to expansion of their own capabilities, and instead would
"accept the reality of emerging new military powers." 102
The flexibility provided by selective engagement may not only prove to be
desirable in post-Cold War Northeast Asia, it may also prove inevitable. "A United States
that is undergoing an economic revolution will be unwilling to pay the price for extensive
unilateral action and the prospects for consensual action will be modest in the near
future.
" IUJ
Selective engagement allows America to remain engaged in Northeast Asia as
an active participant, shaping the regional security environment, but in a more cost-
effective manner than is possible with Cold War-era policies.
Alberto Coll. in his 1992 article for Foreign Affairs. "America as the Grand
Facilitator." suggests that a principal aim of U.S. foreign and defense policies in the post-
Cold War era should be to "maintain a global balance of power and regional balances of
power favorable to the United States and its allies." 104 To accomplish this goal. Coll
argues that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy for the United States is to act as a
"grand facilitator" of the existing international order. This role would require that
America help maintain global and regional balances of power, and serve as benevolent
arbiter or mediator in regions critical to its national interests. 105
Rather tlian carrying on its shoulders. Atlas-like, the entire burden of
containing local hegemons, the United States should play a role of 'holder
of the balance' akin to that played by Great Britain during much of the
eigfueenth and nineteenth centuries. For the foreseeable future, the United
States will have the geographical security, political prestige, and military
"' : Goldberg "Selective Engagement" 16
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power to organize and lead coalition-building efforts geared to check the
expansionists tendencies of local powers in specific regions.
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Moreover. Coll contends that the "distinguishing mark of a grand facilitator is its ability
to relate its national interests to the interests of other states and the larger purposes of
international society."
Maintaining regional balances of power will require a foreign policy that
complements existing alliances with a set of "flexible alliances" or "shifting coalitions"
through which the United States would enter into temporary cooperative political and
military arrangements with states that share its goals in a particular region. 107 Coll
acknowledges that such a diplomatic strategy will be difficult to implement, and will
"require large doses of patience and skill."
Separate from balance of power considerations, another component of U.S.
diplomatic strategy would be. in words Coll attributes to Paul Nitze, that of "honest
broker." In this role the United States would actively engage in "mediating regional
disputes and conflicts to help resolve them in ways that further America's larger
international objectives." Coll argues that the United States is uniquely suited for the role
of benevolent arbiter because of its "geographic isolation, its historic aversion to wars of
conquest, its character as a democratic, pluralistic society of immigrants of all faiths and
nationalities, and the relative success of its economic and political system" which give it
greater universal appeal and credibility than any other nation. As the benevolent arbiter
in Northeast Asia, the United States could take advantage of its economic and military
leverage to "moderate security anxieties, restrain destabilizing arms races, and channel
economic competition for the common good." 108
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In post-Cold War Northeast Asia, a U.S. security policy based on the concept of
selective engagement would cast America in the role of grand facilitator, honest broker and
engaged balancer. By performing these roles. American diplomacy would serve U.S.
interests by maintaining a stable and effective regional political and economic structure.
As grand facilitator and honest broker, the United States might find itself conducting
negotiations on Korean unification, not from the position of South Korea's protector, but
from the vantage of a impartial third party seeking the greater good. As balancer, the
chief concern of the United States would not be to create a perfect equilibrium of forces,
or to ensure that one nation is stronger than another, but rather to guard against the
unfolding of destabilizing imbalances. Through a flexible policy of loose alignment and
ad hoc coalition-building, the United States could use its considerable political, military,
and economic weight to correct dangerous imbalances, thereby restoring stability and
protecting American security interests.
E. SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY TO ASIA
In light of the geo-political realities of post-Cold War Northeast Asia, the United
States may now be shouldering too much of the burden for regional stability:
America's strategy of extended deterrence, then, has not changed much
since the collapse of the Soviet Union: The United States takes
extraordinary responsibility for Asia 's stability—while paying much less
attention to the foundations of its own power. Japan, or, for that matter,
any other country ofEast Asia, takes little more responsibility for regional
security tlian it did during tfie Cold War. It is clearly time for a change. 1W
The diplomatic aspects of a grand strategy of selective engagement would allow the United
States to begin shifting more responsibility for regional security to Asian nations.
109
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As discussed in Chapter III. Northeast Asia is an uncertain and potentially
dangerous region. The answer to America's security concerns, however, is not to
unilaterally provide regional security into perpetuity. By contributing to the Northeast
Asian equilibrium in the role of engaged balancer, the United States can serve its most
important regional objective-maintaining regional stability—and retain the flexibility to act
either unilaterally, or in concert with temporary partners, on other issues. Particularly
well suited for the role of balancer, the United States would remain actively engaged in
Northeast Asia without the responsibilities of a unilateral defender of the peace. 110 "By
remaining engaged. Washington will retain vital leverage with Japan. China, and others
in the region's rough-and-tumble balance-of-power politics."" 1
The cultivation of a stable regional equilibrium would permit the United States to
gradually assume a relatively smaller role in Northeast Asian security without sacrificing
important security objectives. Rather than expend diplomatic energies trying to meet every
challenge to America's preeminence. U.S. foreign policy would harness the inherent
dynamics of a balance of power system, by encouraging and facilitating balancing
behavior, to serve its security needs. Recognizing that the emergence of regional great
powers is inevitable. American diplomacy would endeavor to adjust to, and compensate
for. changes in equilibrium.
Herein lies a dilemma. U.S. grand strategy throughout the Cold War embraced
a necessary dichotomy: containment was meant not only to restrain Soviet expansionism,
but also to ensure the continued non-belligerence of Germany and Japan. Today, nearly
fifty years after the defeat of Imperial Japan, U.S. security policy is still guided by the
"ghosts of World Warn." 112
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The East Asian fear of a resurgent Japan cannot be discounted. Whether real or
imagined, many regional policy-makers would perceive a fully independent Japan to be
a threat to their states' security. This perception could prompt regional actors to react in
a manner inconsistent with normal balancing, thus creating instability and conditions
prejudicial to U.S. security interests.
Although the political, military and economic elements of a grand strategy of
selective engagement are predicated on the assumption that Japan will eventually function
as a full partner in the regional balance of power, a Japan-inspired security dilemma and
the resulting instability, would render those policies self-defeating. Accordingly, a central
question facing U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy in Northeast Asia is how to facilitate
an expansion of Japan's role without setting off a regional arms race. This dilemma is the
subject of the next chapter.
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VI. MAKING JAPAN A "NORMAL COUNTRY:" THE U.S. ROLE
The dilemma posed by Japan requires that the United States take an active role in
ushering Japan onto the world stage as a leading character. Particularly crucial is that
Japan assume its rightful place in the Northeast Asian regional structure and as a fully
fledged partner in the regional balance of power. This chapter first examines what
motivates Japan, and how Tokyo plans to achieve its objectives. Next, it explores the
U.S. -Japan security relationship, and how it should evolve to compensate for the new
realities of post-Cold War Northeast Asia. Similarly, it discusses the promise of
multilateralism, and what might result from the creation of a regional architecture for
security dialogue.
A. JAPANS SECURITY POLICIES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Following Japan's defeat in World War n. the U.S. occupation government set out
to ensure that Japan would never again pose a threat to regional or global security. The
destruction of the Japanese military as a domestic political actor, and the construction of
the 1947 Peace Constitution were essential elements in that process. With the "loss" of
Nationalist China in 1949, and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 America found
reason to shift its position on Japanese rearmament.
113 Under the leadership of Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japan resisted U.S. pressure to remilitarize, but did agree to
the security treaties of 1951 and 1960. In return for granting the United States the right
to station troops in Japan, Yoshida gained a U.S. security guarantee without having to
1,3 David Arase. "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," Contemporary Security
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make any reciprocal or third-party commitments. 114 Shielded by American arms, Japan
avoided contentious international issues, and focused its national energies on economic
pursuits. Dubbed the Yoshida Doctrine, this strategy would remain at the core of Japanese
security policy for the next four decades.
115
Responding to U.S. demands in the early 1980s for defense burden-sharing, Japan
began to modify its passive stance on national security. Militarily, Tokyo agreed to a
larger role in its own defense, and assumed responsibility for sea lane defense out to 1000
nautical miles from Japan. Restrained by domestic opinion. Tokyo was still prevented
from explicitly committing the JSDF to anything but local defense of the Japanese
homeland. "To broaden its contributions to Western security, Japan began to portray
economic assistance as a security contribution." 116
Mounting pressure from the United States on Tokyo to increase its level of burden-
sharing resulted in no real changes in Japanese defense policy, but did prompt Japan to
name and "doctrinalize" what it had been doing all along. Tokyo's concept of sogo
anzen hosho (comprehensive security) is a label developed in the early 1980s, and is
described by Edward Olsen in this way:
The doctrine declares dial the Japanese consider security to be broadly
defined to include its economic and political components, not exclusively or
primarily its military facets. The doctrine further emphasizes that Japan
sliall focus on the nonmilitary portions of comprehensive security where it
has cultivated significant assets in the post-World War II period, and
minimize its military contributions to security in keeping with constraints
imposed by Article Nine of its postwar constitution and with the sentiments
of tlie Japanese people who are reluctant to become entangled in collective
security. To its protagonists this doctrine reflects an equitable distribution
I 14 Arase "New Directions" 44
115 Eugene Brown, Japan's Searchfor Strategic Vision: The Contemporary Debate
(Carlisle Barracks: SSI, 1993) 1.
110 Arase "New Directions" 45
ofburdens in which Japan undertakes what it is most suited to perforin and
the United States upholds its interests on the military security front where
u enjoys many comparative advantages. 1 "
Framed by the Peace Constitution, the Yoshida Doctrine, and the concept of
comprehensive security. Japanese security policy in the postwar period remained decidedly
non-international. The end of the Cold War. and Japan's meteoric rise to the status of a
great economic power, however, began to stir internal, as well as external debate
concerning Tokyo's proper role in regional and international politics. Spurred on by the
Gulf War, Japan now wrestles with a contentious debate about the future of her foreign
and national security policies.
B. JAPAN PREPARES TO TAKE THE STAGE
Chalmers Johnson writes: "Japan's agenda for the next decade is to resume
responsibility for its own foreign policy and to begin to shape the world in which it lives
rather than simply adjusting to it."" 8 Brian Bridges, in his monograph Japan: Hesitant
Superpower, contends that Japanese elites now realize that "the passive, essentially
reactive, foreign policy of the past four decades or so is no longer feasible in the more
complex post-Cold war environment."" 9 Eugene Brown maintains:
There is currently underway at elite levels a thoughtful dialogue over such
fundamental matters as the nature ofJapanese interests, potential threats
to those interests, and the requisite measures to counter those threats.
Lending urgency to the dialogue are two external factors tliat together
117 Edward A Olsen, "Korean Security Is Japan's 'Comprehensive Security' Model a
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challenge virtually the entire foundation ofJapan 's postwar international
stance: the demise of the Cold War and the perceived relative decline of
the United States. Occurring separately, either phenomenon would trigger
a broad rethinking of Japan 's international posture. Occurring nearly
simultaneously, they have called into question the core axioms that have
guided Japanese foreign policy since 1945.' 20
The end of the Cold War is not the only factor behind Japan's strategic debate:
"There is a rough consensus among the Japanese today, based upon the experience of the
Gulf crisis, that Japan should assume a larger responsibility and play a more active role
in the world." 121 Okawara Yoshio adds that while public opinion polls clearly show a
consensus on the need to change, no one has yet devised a grand strategy for Japan's
global vision. 1 "
During the Cold War. Japan's national security policy took on primarily economic
dimensions. "Japanese interests in this environment were clear: economic reconstruction,
international political rehabilitation, and ensuring national security." 123 Japanese leaders
adopted a two-pronged strategy to meet these interests:
(1) to concentrate on expanding foreign markets for Japanese exports to
foster economic development, while nurturing Japanese industries and
gaining control over high- value-added technologies critical to Japanese
industrial competitiveness; and (2) to minimize military expenditures and
maintain a low political profile, relying on the United States to guarantee
Japan 's external security. I24
Brown "Japanese Security Policy" 430.
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A variety of domestic and international factors now motivate Japan to formulate
more independent foreign and national security policies. Inoguchi Takashi. in his article
"Japan's Role in International Affairs." suggests at least six factors that have influenced
Japanese decision-making. First, the rapid growth of Japan's economy to proportions
overshadowed only by that of the United States mandates that Japan assume a
commensurate position in international politics. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union
may have ended America's domestic justification for maintaining an active political and
military presence in Northeast Asia. Without this justification, many Japanese are certain
that pressures within the United States to find solutions to domestic ills will eventually
result in a major retrenchment. Similarly, the perception that America has entered an
irreversible state of relative economic and political decline suggests that Japan will have
to fill the void left by a receding U.S. presence. Third, the end of the Cold War has swept
away the bipolar international structure, and in its place a multipolar system has taken
shape. Inoguchi postulates that in a multipolar system the influence of the superpower(s)
will decline, and that of the major powers, including Japan, will increase. Fourth,
Inoguchi contends that "with the demise of the Soviet military threat, military power is not
as important in international affairs as it once was."
125
Accordingly, Japan, which is
primarily an economic power, should have more leverage and play a more important role
than during the previous era. Fifth, the failure of America's political leadership to
revitalize U.S. industrial and financial sectors has left Japan—with its high savings rate and
large trade surplus-as "virtually the only country that can afford to underwrite large-scale
international public policy actions."
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Finally, Japan's export-oriented economy and high
levels of direct investment overseas has "embedded Japan even more deeply in the
25
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international economic system, giving it a wide range of international economic interests,"
and ensuring that Japan has a keen awareness of international affairs.
127
Japan's strategic debate is characterized by several key issues. Eugene Brown in
his monograph. Japan's Search for Strategic Vision, contends that:
. . . the debate centers on which axis is most crucial to Japan 's future: the
bilateral axis linking Japan in a global partnership with the United States
or the regional axis linking Japan with the rest ofAsia. The two paradigms
are not, of course, mutually exclusive. It is axiomatic that both its trans-
Pacific ties to the United States and its regional links with the rest ofAsia
will constitute Japan 's principal external interests in the coming decades.
It is also the case, however, that among Japanese opinion elites there is a
competition under way over which of the two paradigms should lie at the
heart of Japan 's nascent effort to construct a coherent foreign policy
strategy.
I:tl
Furthermore. Brown asserts that Japan has four broad strategic options. Though
these options are not mutually exclusive, the "debate involves the relative efficacy of, and
priority to be accorded to the four approaches." They include: unilateral enhancement of
the capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces; participation and increased reliance on
international and multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations; construction of
an East Asian regional security architecture; and continued bilateral security ties with the
United States. 129
Chalmers Johnson argues that there are three obstacles along Japan's path to a
"normal" role. First. Japan must change its neo-mercantilistic economic policies—and the
predatory business practices they condone— in order to make progress on other issues.
Second. Japan must decide how to handle its bilateral security relationship with a United
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States it perceives as being in decline. Third. Japan must find a way to overcome its
World WarEI legacy, reconcile with its neighbors, and assume a well-rounded leadership
role in Asia.
ljU
Japan's Peace Constitution adds another layer of complexity to the ongoing
strategic debate. Ozawa Ichiro, the power behind the last two Japanese governments,
"would like to cut through the constitutional tangle by scrapping article nine altogether." 131
At present, this has little popular support-as little as seven percent according to an opinion
poll in January 1994.
I3:
This type of drastic action, however, is probably not necessary.
Although many Japanese argue that the Constitution prohibits any expansion of Japan's
security role, the reality is that the government has the flexibility to interpret the
Constitution as it sees fit to serve national security as long as there is a consensus among
the political habatsu that is accepted by the Japanese public. 133
Neither General MacArthur nor Prime Minister Yoshida believed that the inherent
right of self-defense was unconstitutional, and their opinions were affirmed in 1959, when
Japan's Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution "in no way denies the right of self-
defense." and deferred future interpretations of the document to the Japanese
government. 134 "Consequently, the type of military equipment and role the Japanese Serf-
Defense Forces should play has been decided by the government in an incremental way,
n
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building a national consensus on security policy." 135
Over time, the Peace Constitution has been interpreted so as to allow the SDF to
possess various weapons systems, and to legitimize the deployment of Japanese forces
outside territorial limits. Because the Japanese government, with elite consensus and
public support, is free to interpret the Constitution in a manner that would allow for a
more active or aggressive military posture, this contingency should not be discounted
because o\~ Western notions of unconstitutionality. 136
The points raised by Brown. Johnson. Staples and Van der Velde suggest a strategic
debate in Japan that is far from resolved. Herein lies the role of the United States: by
applying influence and leverage to Japan's loci of strategic decision-making, America can
coax Tokyo in a direction that will facilitate her acceptance onto the Northeast Asian stage
as a "normal country." and in the process, enhance U.S. interests in the region by enabling
the transition to a grand strategy of selective engagement. The U.S. can expedite Japan's
acceptance in two ways: first, by effectively managing the transformation of the U.S.-
Japan security relationship and the concurrent expansion of Japan's indigenous security
mechanisms: and second, by enmeshing Japan into appropriate multilateral economic and
security regimes.
C. TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
U.S. national security policy should encourage Japan to continue on the road to
greater strategic independence. Although it may be that "regardless of what Americans
do, Japanese momentum in much of the LDP, the business community, the intelligentsia,
135 Staples "Security in the 1990s" 1 12.
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journalism, and the bureaucracy is toward greater independence from the United States," 137
it is imperative that U.S. grand strategy remain engaged in order to exert an influence on
the outcome.
The United States should also ensure that Japan's transition to major power status
occurs gradually. While the emergence of Japan as a full partner in the Northeast Asian
balance of power can have a stabilizing effect, a rapid alteration of the regional
equilibrium would, by definition, create instability. By encouraging an incremental
transformation of Japanese security policy, the U.S. can provide time for Tokyo to work
out its differences with other regional actors, as well as allow Japanese leaders the time
"to build the necessary domestic support to expand Japan's independent defense
capabilities along the lines that former prime minister Nakasone proposed in the mid-
1980s."" 8
Structural realism notwithstanding, an independent Japanese security policy is
bound to reflect the unique characteristics and preferences of Japanese society. Peter J.
Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara write in "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms,
and Policies." that Japan's national security policy has two distinctive aspects that deserve
analysis:
First, Japan's definition of national security goes far beyond traditional
military notions. National security is viewed in comprehensive terms that
also include economic and political dimensions. Tlie second feature of
Japan's security policy worth explanation is a distinctive mixture of
flexibility and rigidity in the process of policy adaption to change:
flexibility on issues of economic security, rigidity on issues of military
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Katzenstein and Okawara conclude that Japan's security policy is not determined by
international structures, but rather by "the structure of the state broadly conceived and the
incentives it provides for policy on the one hand, and on the other by the context of social
and legal norms that help define policy interests and the standards of appropriateness for
specific policy choices." 140 This conclusion leads the authors to speculate that post-Cold
War Japan, if given a choice, will make a simultaneous choice for growing economic
involvement with Asia and a continued, if altered, security relationship with the United
States.
Tokyo's preference for a security policy heavily weighted in favor of economic or
political strategies is an inevitable outgrowth of its postwar bias against military solutions
and should not be a source of concern for U.S. strategic planners. A militarily defensive
Japan, espousing the virtues of economic liberalism is perfectly compatible with the
Northeast Asian structure, despite the realist world views and geo-political grand strategies
of China and Russia.
The mission of U.S. diplomacy should be to encourage Tokyo to assume a greater
responsibility for Northeast Asian security through its preferred methods of economic and
political activism, while assuring other regional actors that America's ultimate goal is a
stable and effective balance of power in which no state seeks hegemony. Concurrently,
U.S. policy should be structured so as to bring about a gradual weaning of Japan from
dependence on U.S. military security guarantees. By pursuing these policies with the full
cognizance of the international and regional community, the U.S. and Japan can conduct
an important transition without creating disequilibrium, uncertainty, or a security dilemma.
As an political and economic great power, with the ability to defend itself and its
immediate sea lanes, Japan would serve as an effective player in a regional balance of
power. Militarily, Japan is well suited for its preferred defensive role for several reasons.
"Japan's National Security" 86
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First. Japan is an insular nation and maritime power. Although China has begun to
recognize and protect its maritime interests, its strategic center-of-gravity, like that of
Russia, remains continental, and thus highly resistant to purely maritime force.
Conversely. Japan's strategic center is maritime, and not particularly vulnerable to a
predominantly continental power. 141 While China and Russia may eventually float
impressive fleets with far more ability to project power onto land than past armadas,
Japan's insular geography and superior technology means that she would only have to
deploy a modest navy to preserve the military balance.
Moreover, an unprovoked or inordinate naval expansion by either China or Russia
would not only justify a Japanese response, but would probably incite the United States
to act in its role as engaged balancer, and throw its maritime weight in with Japan. This
action would either reestablish equilibrium and preserve the peace, or if conflict resulted,
place the United States in a position of strategic advantage.
Japan's two most acute military vulnerabilities—her lack of indigenous resources,
and concentrated population—could be compensated for with non-threatening military
solutions. First. Japan's resource supply-line, which moves entirely by maritime air and
sea routes are amenable to protection by her substantial naval forces. In particular, Japan's
technologically advanced anti-air, anti-mine and anti-submarine forces would be
indispensable in the protection of her maritime links to the world. Second. Japan's
concentrated population could be given some protection against airborne weapons by
constructing a modest ballistic and cruise missile defense system. Modeled along the lines
of U.S. theater missile defense systems currently under development, a Japanese version
could utilize existing sea-based Aegis and airborne intercept technology, as well as next
generation land-based tracking and counter-measures.
141 Concept of strategic centers of gravity borrowed from Colin Gray. The Leverage of
Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage ofNavies m War (New York: Free Press, 1992): 1-91
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Additionally. Tokyo could further complicate the intentions of a potential aggressor
by developing what Paul Nitze has called a "strategic non-nuclear deterrent." By mating
cutting-edge advanced conventional munitions with modern aircraft, submarines, and
surface vessels. Japan could construct a viable deterrent force that would be in keeping
with contemporary consensus on the role of the SDF, and would not violate the spirit of
the three non-nuclear principles. Furthermore, the implicit understanding throughout
Northeast Asia that Japan could probably arm its stealthy and accurate delivery systems
with nuclear weapons in short order, if it so desired, would add credibility to the deterrent.
While the deployment of a national missile defense system and a strategic non-nuclear
deterrent would undoubtedly be controversial and expensive, it would allow Japan to stay
true to its preference for a passive military role, without having to rely on the United
States, or compromising the security of its people.
In sum. U.S. diplomacy should guide Tokyo during this period of transition in
order to produce a more independent Japanese security policy that is: more responsible
for overall security in Northeast Asia: non-threatening to other regional actors; in keeping
with Japan's norms and preferences: and less dependent on U.S. military might.
Although China and Russia are guided by geo-political world views, they have also
come to understand and respect the power of economics, and should find Japan an
acceptable player in the regional balance of power. Japan's transition to a more active and
independent role, however, could create uncertainties that would endanger Northeast Asian
stability. For this reason it will become essential that the United States endeavor to
involve Japan in a wide range of political, economic, and military security regimes with
the objective of increasing understanding and transparency.
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D. THE PROMISE OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY
While prescriptions of multilateralism may seem antithetical to the geo-political
realities of Northeast Asia, various confidence-building measures (CBMs) may be useful
in easing the transition to. and undesirable side-effects of a multipolar balance of power
system. Dam. Deutch. Nye and Rowe argue that the "the United States should seek to
manage Japan's rise to great power status by enmeshing Japan in a network of international
institutions." and contend that this strategy promotes American interests in several ways:
Such a network will encourage Japan to pursue its national interests
through multilateral cooperation. It will also open up new avenues by
which the United States can influence Japanese policy. Finally, it will
prompt Japan to define its national interests in less insular terms.
142
Moreover. Japan's participation in regional economic and security forums would reassure
those who are still suspicious of Japan's intentions that Tokyo wishes to be a responsible
actor on the world stage. "Unlike Germany. Japan does not benefit from a stabilizing
framework of international economic and security institutions that channel the rise of
Japanese power while reassuring other countries about Japanese intentions." 143 By
encouraging Tokyo to expand its participation in regional forums, Washington could gently
persuade Japan to assume more responsibility for its own security, while reassuring other
regional actors that the U.S. understands their concerns, and intends to remain engaged
in Northeast Asia.
An important preliminary step in discussing multilateral cooperative security
regimes is to define terms. Often the terms cooperative security, and security cooperation
142 Kenneth Dam. John Deutch, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David M Rowe, "Harnessing
Japan A US. Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power," The Washington
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are used interchangeably to refer to the same concept. Andrew Mack in his study,
"Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," provides useful
clarification:
Security cooperation is associated with alliances, and alliances of states
rend to be formed against another state, or group of states. What defines
the alliance is common opposition to a common foe.
144
Conversely,
Cooperative security—sometimes known as 'common security'—is based on
a somewhat different set of assumptions. Here the focus is less on
preventing unprovoked aggression a la Saddam Hussein or Hitler, but
rather to counteract the more probable causes ofwar—those which arise out
of 'security dilemma' and 'conflict spirals.
,145
Mack explains how common security functions:
Common security policies do not require a specific enemy. They are based
on the proposition ttiat witliin a community of states there will inevitably be
a range of more or less serious disputes, but that generally states would
prefer not to resort to war to deal with those disputes. Common security
policies offer the military means (arms control/confidence-
building/defensive restructuring) intended to reduce the probability that
such disputes will escalate and lead to a war that none of the parties
originally intended. Common security policies are not an alternative to
creative diplomacy and conflict resolution strategies but rather complement
them.
14"
Until early 1991 . Japan was reluctant to support multilateral approaches to regional
security, primarily for two reasons. First "she had felt that her strained relations with the
then Soviet Union might become more complicated by the latter' s participation in a






regional dialogue scheme in which she would also participate." 147 Second, Japan was
concerned that multilateral plans might weaken her existing bilateral security relationship
with the United States.' 48
Similarly, the United States resisted one Cold War-era proposal after another for
regional cooperative security in Northeast Asia. Ambitious plans for CBMs put forth by
the Soviet Union, as well as Canada's North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
(NPCSD). and Australia's Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) were
quickly rejected by Washington because they were seen as "providing the Soviets with a
diplomatic entree to the region for which they would have to pay no price, and conferring
on them the unwanted status oi' legitimate regional security 'players.'" 149 Additionally,
regional security dialogues were dismissed because both Washington and the pro-Western
states believed:
... U.S. military superiority was the best guarantor of security in the region
since it offered the best protection against aggression. Tliat superiority was
an established fact and was unlikely to be cfiallenged since the Soviet
economy was moving into crisis. Tlie Soviet agenda for confidence- and
security-building measures was clearly designed to reduce U.S. regional
maritime militaiy superiority. There was thus no point in engaging in
negotiations with Moscow. '50
Washington surmised that Moscow would take advantage of any multilateral security
forums to push for measures, such as naval arms control, that would undermine U.S., and
thus reszional interests.
14
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Attitudes toward cooperative security have undergone a dramatic reversal in both
the United States and Japan. For a number of reasons, including the end of the Cold War,
the lessons of the Gulf War. Japan's desire for a greater regional role, and a grudging
acceptance on both sides of the Pacific that times are changing. Washington and Tokyo are
now indicating that they want to participate in Asian security dialogues.
Although a handful of organizations do exist that could provide a forum for
Northeast Asian security issues, the relative lack of regional institutions suggests that some
innovation is unavoidable. "The United States must involve Japan in the building of new
international institutions as well."
151
Patrick Cronin in his essay "Does Multilateralism
Have a Future in Asia?" makes six generalizations regarding the perceived pitfalls and
problems often ascribed to proposals for new multilateral institutions in Asia. First, "a
number of critics point out that many proposals have something in common: namely a
fallacious belief in an emerging Pacific Community that has been in the offing for more
than a century."
152 While it is certainly true that the Northeast Asian community does not
share the same congmity of interests or tradition of cooperation as do the nations of
Western Europe, an issue-specific approach could provide some common starting point.
Organizations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), which has
focused primarily on trade issues, provide an example of successful institutions that began
with specific, and modest objectives.
Second, the unfulfilled promise of arms control has caused many to sour on the
prospects for meaningful security regimes. This is most likely the result of trying to
impose the means of arms control in the absence of an agreement on the end goals among
the political community in question. A simple solution is to forego discussions of arms
151 Dam. Deutch. Nye and Rowe 40
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control in favor of multilateral security dialogues that would focus on transparency, official
and unofficial "roundtables." and other confidence-building measures. 153 Such dialogues
can provide meaningful results and serve as a basis for more complex future negotiations.
Third, critics claim new multilateral proposals often serve to undermine existing
institutions and efforts. Examples of institutions that may suffer include the United
Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although some new issue- specific
institutions may be required, particularly in realms where existing organizations have
failed, the United States should "promote a greater Japanese role in those international and
regional institutions that already exist."
154 Organizations in which a more active Japanese
role would facilitate Tokyo's acceptance in Northeast Asia include: the Group of Seven
(G-7): the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT): the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD): the World Bank: the International Monetary Fund; and the United Nations
Security Council. 155
A fourth pitfall is the perceived inherent inefficiency of multilateralism in general.
Despite Asia's virtual lack of multilateral tradition, success in other parts of the globe give
reason to hold some optimism. Moreover, the success of ASEAN debunks claims that
Asians are incapable of multilateralism, and sets a precedent for Northeast Asia to follow.
Fifth, it is alleged that most multilateral approaches are at odds with U.S. national
security because they serve to dilute America's power in the region, discount the value of
U.S. military might, and hasten the decline of U.S. bilateral alliances. While these
institutions may. in one sense, dilute U.S. power, they also—as Dam, Deutch, Nye and
Rowe pointed out above-open new avenues through which America can exert influence.
I?3 Mack "Security Cooperation" 25.
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This diversification of the U.S. portfolio will become even more crucial as changes in
regional power distribution, and growth in the Japanese and Chinese economies further
erodes traditional American bluechips. Moreover, it is important to recognize that with
decreased U.S. influence comes a concurrent lessening of responsibility that will allow
America to redirect previously committed resources and energy elsewhere.
Finally, critics point out that the costs of multilateralism are high, and that there
is "little appetite among the great powers for ambitious institution building." 156 Although
the costs associated with complex institutions, such as the United Nations or NATO, is
admittedly high, history has shown them to be virtually irreplaceable. Furthermore, the
types of new institutions proposed here are by no means elaborate. Regional dialogues and
forums to discuss economics and security could be either government, or non-government,
and—unlike more complex institutions—would not necessarily require mechanisms for
integration, monitoring, or enforcement.
Several possibilities exist for creating new cooperative security regimes in
Northeast Asia. Among the most ambitious is the call for an Asian version of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), tentatively titled the CSCA.
While it is true, as this thesis has already argued, that Europe and Asia are very different,
a neophyte CSCA would begin with the modest goal of providing only a forum for the
debate of security issues in the broadest sense of the word. "The purpose would be to
provide a single platform for regional debate, in contrast to the multiple public and private
means by which information is conveyed among Pacific states." 157
Another possibility is a hexagonal, or great power forum in Northeast Asia. By
restricting its focus to this sub-region, a hexagonal forum could avoid the pitfalls
associated with the diversity of Asia, and limit itself only to those security issues which
150 Cronin "Multilateralism in Asia" 274-276.
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directly concern China, Japan. Russia, the United States, and the Koreas. This sort of
informal great power concert could lend itself to ad hoc. cooperative solutions to Northeast
Asian problems such as the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the Korean
reunification issue, and the Senkaku Islands dispute. 158
Finally. Northeast Asian security might be enhanced by the creation of a maritime
confidence- and security-building regime. Patrick Cronin cites one Australian proposal
which focused on "a regional maritime surveillance and safety regime optimized for a
spectrum of tasks" which fall short of war. including: compilation of a shipping plot of
all vessels within the jurisdiction of the regime: monitoring of illegal activities, including
drug smuggling, piracy, unlicensed fishing, and unauthorized population movements:
planning for the naval control and protection of shipping transiting the area: search and
rescue: controlling and monitoring marine pollution: and generally sharing maritime
information and intelligence. I5Q
"The minimum need to support multilateralism calls for the spirit of creating a
habit of getting together and being exposed to different views and overcoming the fear,
based on ignorance, of other nations." 160 While a system of rigid security cooperation,
based on alliance structures and the perception of a common enemy would indeed be
detrimental to great power equilibrium in Northeast Asia, an informal collection of
cooperative security forums would not inhibit the operation of the balance of power, and
might smooth some of the rough edges associated with regional geo-politics. Although
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multilateral prescriptions may be unable to change the systemic causes of Northeast Asian
great power competition, they may be useful in easing the symptoms.
Moreover, as post-Cold War conditions continue to erode America's traditional
avenues of influence, encouraging Tokyo to participate in regional dialogues—alongside
the U.S.-- will not only facilitate Japan's acceptance into the Northeast Asian security
community, but will provide new inroads for Washington's diplomacy.
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VII. THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY
"With 30.000 men in transports at the Downs, the English can paralyze 300,000 of my
army, and tfiat will reduce lis to the rank ofa second-class power! " Napoleon Bonaparte
The military aspects of a grand strategy of selective engagement could be
characterized as traditionally maritime, but would be concerned with much more than
simply naval war doctrine. Mackubin Owens, of the Naval War College, attributes the
theoretical basis of maritime grand strategy to the writings of Sir Julian Corbett, who
wrote: "By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea
is a substantial factor."
161
Militarily, a maritime grand strategy would take advantage of
the inherent strengths of a strategy rooted in flexibility and robust mobility. In today's
world of high-speed, high endurance air transport, it is conceivable, though unlikely, that
a maritime grand strategy could be employed without ships!
A. MARITIME VS. CONTINENTAL POWER
The ability to move armies by sea (or maritime air routes) gives the maritime
nation a commanding advantage in times of war. Colin Gray, in Tlie Leverage of Sea
Power examines ten major conflicts in history in which maritime powers battled with
continental hegemons, and reaches several important conclusions:
The historical evidence reveals that superior sea power typically functions
to permit its owner to use time in the search for advantage. Sea power
allows the protraction of conflict and tends to set up a frustrated continental
enemy to overreach on land. History shows that in key respects an
important advantage in sea power grants the ability to control the
161 quoted in Mackubin Thomas Owens. "Toward a Maritime Grand Strategy: Paradigm
for a New Security Environment," Strategic Review Spring 1993: 12.
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geostrategic terms of engagement in war. Depending on who controls the
sea, water is a highway or a barrier. The continuity of the world's seas
and oceans translates into a global mobility and agiliry for maritime forces
and for merchant shipping which can have no continental parallel. That
mobility and agility has been used time and time again, in all historical
periods, to achieve surprise arid the full strategic advantage of the surprise
effect. Finally, and not withstanding the several revolutions in
transponation technologies for all environments over the centuries, superior
sea power has enabled its owners to knit together coalitions with a total
strategic weight greatly superior to those secured by dominant continental
strength.
,62
Insular states, which are best suited for a maritime grand strategy, have the luxury
of foregoing a heavy, land-based forward defense and, by virtue of their flexibility, still
retain the capability to act unilaterally or multilaterally. in the strength, venue, and fashion
of their choosing. This capability gives that nation's forces the freedom of maneuver and
action necessary to respond to crises of a wide range of circumstance and scope.
Moreover, a maritime grand strategy allows "island" nations, such as nineteenth century
Britain or the twentieth century United States, to play a unique role in balance of power
systems: that of the offshore balancer. Morton Kaplan discusses the English example:
It is possible that a major factor accounting for British success in the
'balancing ' role in the nineteenth century lay in the fact tfiat Great Britain
was predominantly a naval power and had no territorial ambitions on the
European continent. These facts increased the tolerance of other national
actors for Britain 's 'balancing ' role. As a preponderant maritime power.
Great Britain could interfere with the shipping of other powers and could
transport its small army; it also was able to use its naval capabilities to
dispel invading forces. 163
By permitting the maritime power the flexibility to act as balancer, and facilitating the
creation of coalitions and alignments, the military elements of a maritime national strategy
"): Gray The Leverage ofSea Power xi-xii.
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serve not only military ends, but also diplomatic purposes, and thus contribute to an
overall grand strategy that is greater than the sum of its parts.
Historically. Colin Gray asserts, maritime powers have employed some common
military strategies. Although these strategies may also be effective against other maritime
nations, they have typically been most successful against a continental adversary. First,
a sea power can impose a commercial, and in part, maritime blockade to redirect trade,
and exhaust a continental foe financially, though this is rarely successful in the modem
age. Second, if the financial exhaustion of an enemy is impracticable, a supply blockade,
aimed at interdicting the materials of war. may provide strategic leverage. Third, a
maritime power in a position of weakness can raid the periphery of a land bastion, and
conduct "warfare for the purposes of imposing a debilitating dispersal in military
deployment on the enemy, sustaining morale at home and among captive nations, for the
encouragement of neutrals to keep their options open, and to inflict damage." 164 Fourth,
a sea power can move beyond raiding to a strategy of peripheral warfare. This strategy
takes full advantage of geo-strategic mobility to impose protracted combat on unfavorable
terms on a continental enemy. Fifth, the maritime power can engage in overseas conquest
by attacking or exploiting those interests of the continental power that are at risk to the
sea. Finally, the maritime power can, in extremis, apply direct pressure to a land power
by committing substantial ground forces and assembling an anti-hegemonic coalition on
the continent. 10 '
164 Gray The Leverage ofSea Power 39
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B. FROM FORWARD DEPLOYMENT TO POWER PROJECTION
Since the early years of the Cold War. the United States has relied on an essentially
continental grand strategy to achieve its objectives throughout the globe. Though
"maritime strategy" was an essential element of Cold War national defense policy and its
goal of containment, its scope was limited to naval doctrine, and its primary function was,
and still is to support the ground and air forces needed for a forward defense on the
Eurasian continent. Jan Breemer argues that two reasons dictated the continental
disposition of U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War:
First, the U.S. Navy was expected to have to fight its way across the
Atlantic in order to reinforce a beleaguered Europe, tying up most of its
power in the struggle for command of the sea; naval power projection could
make an indirect contribution at best to the decisive campaign on land.
Next, and more important, the credibility of the American security
guarantee to NATO demanded a 'permanent' commitment of ground
forces.
m
Under certain conditions, even the great maritime powers have found it necessary
to adopt a more continentally focused grand strategy. Just as Britain was forced to
temporarily abandon its cost-effective, but limited maritime policies when faced with
continental hegemony in the form of Napoleonic France and Imperial and Nazi Germany,
so the United States found a continental focus to be essential in containing the Soviet
empire within the rimlands of Eurasia.
Despite the end of the Cold War, this continental focus and the force structure it
dictates, remain central to U.S. strategic planning in Central Europe and Northeast Asia.
In the context of an evolving balance of power system in post-Cold War Northeast Asia,
U.S. interests might be best served by a maritime security policy. Mackubin Owens
contends that while both continental and maritime grand strategies have the goal of keeping
"' r
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regional peace and influencing the Eurasian balance of power, the maritime approach
provides far more flexibility at a moderate cost. Moreover, he adds:
A maritime grand strategy enables the U.S. to actively protect its interests
by shaping the security environment. Yet it does not require the costly
continental commitments of the Cold War. In addition, a maritime grand
strategy is applicable to the strategic circumstances of the U.S. no matter
what kind ofsecurity environment prevails: an essentially 'benign' world,
dominated by collective security, or a liostile environment, characterized by
'international anarchy. ' l67
This approach to grand strategy, applied to contemporary U.S. defense policy,
suggests a decreased reliance on a forward-deployed military posture. In its place, a
maritime grand strategy would rely on easily transportable, flexible forces, deployed by
sea or air from U.S. or international territory, to demonstrate resolve, police trouble spots,
protect interests, or enable the introduction of heavier forces when required.
General George Crist, in his 1990 work, "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing
World." proposes that America restructure its armed forces to place primary reliance on
projecting military power from the United States. Advocating a shift from the Cold War
era forward-deployed strategy to a more "feasible and realistic" power-projection strategy,
Crist asserts:
Militarily, a power-projection strategy dictates that the United States look
seriously to strengthening its conventionalforce deployment capabilityfrom
the continental United States. This involves both forces and means. It also
entails a reordering ofpriorities toward the attainment ofa genuine ability
to expeditiously deploy tailored force packages from home bases to
potential areas of crisis or impending conflict.
I6S
The vast oceanic distances of the Asia-Pacific require that any regional military
strategy that relies on power-projection be backed with formidable transport assets. The
167 Owens "Toward a Maritime Grand Strategy" 13.
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most essential military elements of a U.S. maritime grand strategy for Northeast Asia
would unquestionably be strategic air- and sealift. To again quote Churchill, "Victory is
the beautiful bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never
have blossomed."
Shifting America's strategic weight from forward-deployment to power-projection
would not be without complications. Because strategic air- and sealift are expensive,
attempting to deploy forces of the size and composition of those currently in Northeast
Asia, entirely from the United States would be cost-prohibitive. Instead, the United States
should use its comparative advantage in high-technology to ensure that whenever possible,
relatively small American forces will be capable of successfully engaging larger, less-lethal
units.
Additionally, the maritime pre-positioning program, which has been expanded since
the Gulf war. should continue to grow. These flexible assets are relatively inexpensive,
and provide an immense boost to power-projection capabilities. General Crist notes that
the seventeen pre-positioned ships at Diego Garcia (in 1990) carried 165,000 short tons
of ammunition and supplies-the equivalent of more than 6,100 C-141 transport aircraft
loads.
16'
Finally, strategic lift forces should grow in relative proportion to other defense
assets. As essential tools of a post-Cold War military structure, air- and sealift should
comprise a larger share of a force that will have fewer strategic bombers, nuclear
submarines, aircraft carriers, and heavy armor units. While maintaining a balanced force
is vital, it is important to recognize that "balanced" is a subjective term. What constituted
a balanced force for dealing with the Soviet threat is no longer suitable. "The current
environment, with regional threats erupting with little or no notice, favors smaller, highly






In an increasingly complex and uncertain Northeast Asia, balanced military
forces should not be massive and forward-deployed, but flexible and easily transported.
"If necessary, combat forces (including ships and combat aircraft) will have to be
sacrificed in order to ensure that the remainder of the force will be able to deploy rapidly
enough to be useful."' 71
A maritime grand strategy would require that the service branches replace the
current emphasis on geographic and functional responsibilities with an emphasis on
integration and "comparative advantage." This new focus would ensure that a broad range
of capabilities could be brought to bear as required by any situation. Recognizing that
each service has strengths (comparative advantage) and weaknesses, the force planning
doctrine of a maritime grand strategy should be centered around the concept of joint force
sequencing. "The goal of joint force sequencing is to provide the correct capability that
the Unified Commander needs at the appropriate time. . . Stressing comparative advantage
means that service components are utilized across the spectrum of conflict in such a way
that the strengths are exploited to the fullest while its weaknesses are minimized." 172
Owens' graphic representation of this process is reproduced below:
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Power Projection System for the Spectrum of Conflict
Presence Crisis Conflict Theater War Global War
Day-to-day operations
Shape the security environment
Support Diplomacy
crisis response
rapid deployment rapid reinforcement
deliberate reinforcement
sustainment
naval forces/SOF dominant>^>»enable»>»»naval forces subordinate»»»»
land-based forces subordinate»»»»»»»land-based forces dominant»»»
Figure 1
This figure illustrates the author's assertion that various military components would
be more useful at different points across the spectrum of conflict. Naval expeditionary and
special operations forces (SOF) would predominate during routine operations and
operations in support of diplomacy. In the event of a crisis, these forces may have to be
augmented by rapid deployment forces. As events escalate to a regional conflict or theater
war. naval and expeditionary forces become the means for enabling the introduction of
heavy land forces. "Once theater war is joined, naval forces augment and support the now
dominant land-based capabilities." 173
' 73 Owens "Toward a Maritime Grand Strategy" 16
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C. A FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The implications of joint force sequencing for service component structure are
clear, and the Navy is moving in the right direction with From the Sea. This revolutionary
White Paper recognizes the realities of the post-Cold War security environment, and
acknowledges that America's maritime interests are not likely to be threatened in the near
future by a preponderant force on the scale of the Soviet Union. With this in mind, the
doctrine redirects the Navy's focus toward regional threats and challenges.
From the Sea codifies these perceptions for the naval service by outlining the types
of missions, and thus the force structure, that are required by the new climate. From the
Sea asserts that the Navy will be an important part of the principle elements of national
strategy—strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and
reconstitution. Specifically, naval forces will provide powerful yet unobtrusive presence;
strategic deterrence: control of the seas: extended and continuous on-scene crisis response:
project precise power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale warfighting scenarios
emerge." 4
Much of this is not realiy new. What is new about From ttie Sea is the fundamental
shift it represents away from open-ocean (blue water) warfighting "on the sea," toward
joint operations conducted "from the sea." In doing so, the Navy has reaffirmed, and in
fact redoubled its dedication to the amphibious and expeditionary warfare missions, and
to strategic sealift.
In describing the Navy's new role. From the Sea examines its most important
elements. The focus on "littoral" warfare is evident in the document's discussion of
"Naval Expeditionary Forces," "Joint Operations," and "Operating Forward, From the
Sea." Particularly indicative of the Navy's changing priorities is its willingness to alter
174 Department of the Navy, From the Sea (Washington: USGPO, 1992) 1-8.
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the standard operating procedures of aircraft carriers and submarines. Even the once
immutable carrier battlegroup is on the table, as From the Sea discusses tailoring groups
for special needs, and building task forces around amphibious ships. Indeed, the mating
of aircraft carriers and U.S. Army units during the initial phases of Operation Uphold
Democracy demonstrates the potential of this doctrinal shift. 175
Although the Navy must not neglect strategic deterrence and sea control, the
prevailing paucity of likely threats permits greater attention elsewhere. With presumed
control of the sea lines of communication and the "blue water." naval planners can now
afford more emphasis on naval expeditionary forces, strategic sealift, joint operations, and
littoral warfare. The Navy's plans to modernize its aging amphibious force is an important
first step. Other areas that should be tackled include fleet sealift, naval gunfire/missile
support, theater missile defense, deep-strike missile technology, anti-diesel submarine
warfare, and anti-mine warfare. Additionally. Congress should take action to reverse the
precipitous decline in the U.S. -flagged merchant marine force.
More radical proposals should also be considered. With the North Atlantic now
free of Soviet submarines, the Navy should consider shifting more assets to the Pacific.
Deploying a relatively larger force in the Pacific would provide assurance of America's
commitment to remain engaged in Asia, and would not affect U.S. deployments to the
Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Seventh Fleet vessels on station in Southwest Asia would be
readily available for contingencies in either the Mediterranean or East Asia.
Closely tied to the Navy's littoral warfare mission is the Marine Corps. Ideally
suited for crisis response and rapid deployment, the Marine Corps should continue to be
spared from across-the-board budget cutting. For years the Marines have been moving
away from their traditional amphibious role, and toward one of a professional
expeditionary force. This trend should be continued and encouraged. The Marine Corps
From the Sea 1-7
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does not need the capability to land division-sized forces on heavily fortified beaches, but
rather the speed and versatility to land appropriately-sized expeditionary forces, by air or
sea. in strategically advantageous locations near the sea. Nor does the Corps require
heavy armor, or long-term sustainability. Another possibility the Marine Corps should
consider is foregoing their fixed-wing close air support in favor of more flexible and
deployable rotary-wing assets. In turn, the Navy could provide more support to
expeditionary forces by acquiring "fire support" ships equipped with large numbers of
advanced rocket and missile systems. 176 Additionally, carrier-based naval aviation could
assume more responsibility by emphasizing multipurpose aircraft capable of close-in strike,
local air-superiority and battlefield interdiction, while surface and submarine-launched
cruise missiles could provide a stealthy and effective deep-strike capability until U.S. Air
Force assets are deployed. 177
As the dominant players in "theater war," the Army and Air Force are
indispensable elements of a maritime grand strategy. Blechman, et al.. highlight the
Army's role in a post-Cold War world:
The Army is now, and should remain, the primary U.S. armed force for
seizing and holding territory. The vast preponderance of Army forces
should be based in the United Slates to ensure global flexibility and to
reduce domestic and international political strains... In structuring its
forces, the Army needs to shift further than now planned from its past
emphasis on heavily amioredforces to lighter types of capabilities tfiat can
be deployed more rapidly for the initial defense of U. S. overseas interests.
Demise of the Soviet Amix reduces the need for heavily armored U.S.
armored dixisions intendedfor maneuver warfare. Advanced technologies
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make it possible to lighten Anny forces, moreover, while actually
augmenting their capabilities. /7,s
While heavy forces are typically more difficult to transport, a maritime grand
strategy does not necessitate that all Army forces be "light." The important factor is
transportation, and transportation must be designed to move heavy forces. In order to take
advantage of the strategic benefits of a maritime grand strategy, Army equipment for the
twenty-first century must be either prepositioned or transportable. Moreover, enough lift
must be available to move forces quickly. It is unlikely that another opponent will grant
the United States the six months that were required in the Gulf to deploy a theater army.
Army units should be trained and equipped to operate in both low and high-
intensity environments and in various climes and terrain. Furthermore, decreases in the
Army's size must be offset with better training and advanced weapons technology. High-
tech training systems, coupled with unproved anti-armor, theater missile defense, and C3I
systems will provide Anny forces with greater lethality and flexibility in a smaller
package. This "leaner, meaner" package when mated with greatly expanded strategic air-
and sealift, would serve as the principle fighting force in conflicts ranging from
reinforcement of an expeditionary brigade, to major war.
Finally, a maritime grand strategy has important implications for the U.S. Air
Force. Though some Air Force units (tactical lift, SOF, long-range reconnaissance) might
play a role in the early phases of conflict, their primary focus should be toward "theater
war." Naturally, this implies a heavy accent on the mobility elements of air power. In
order to support a maritime grand strategy, the Air Force should place even more emphasis
than is currently given to the long-range transport of complete units, both their own and
those of the Army, to secure staging areas.
Blechman. et al. 18.
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Air Force tactical air power is also crucial to the success of medium- and large-
scale conflicts. Without rapidly deployable tactical air units to accomplish air-supenority
and perform deep strikes and battlefield interdiction, swiftly deployed ground units are of
no use. Greater deployability has been achieved for ground-based tactical air units, and
this trend should continue.
|7q
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VIII. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY
Perhaps more than any other region. Northeast Asia yields evidence that a principal
threat to the security of U.S. interests in the post-Cold War era lies in the realm of
economics. Accordingly, grand strategy must place greater emphasis on domestic and
foreign policies designed to advance U.S. economic interests. Several alternative
strategies have been proposed. Noted Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson has advocated
a form of "industrial policy" for the United States, combined with the coordination of
fiscal and trade policies with Tokyo. 180 Conservative writers, such as Dam, Deutch, Nye,
and Rowe contend that the central goal of U.S. strategy toward Asia must be to create a
stable macroeconomic environment, and that such a strategy should recognize that "the
main causes of poor U.S. economic performance are flawed macroeconomic policies and
an inability to take action domestically— in capital formation, worker education, and
technology-and not the trading practices of an Asian ally." 181 Ellings and Olsen suggest
that liberals and conservatives can find "common ground" between managed and free trade
to solve such crucial challenges as: access to technology, the uses of aid, strained trade
relations, and the repercussions of foreign direct investment. 182
Definitions of grand strategy often include references to economics. Sir Basil
Liddell-Hart in his book Strategy, argued:
Grand Strategy should calculate and develop the economic resources and
manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services... Grand
strategy, too, sliould regulate the distribution ofpower between the several
services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power
is but one of the instruments ofgrand strategy—which should take account
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of and apply the power offinancial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, to
weaken the opponent's will... It should not only combine the various
instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state
ofpeace—for its security and prosperity.
1S3
The importance of sound economic policies to national security is widely
recognized. While arguing that only arms can defeat arms, Colin Gray admits:
... it is probably correct to argue, for example, that the decisive advantage
oftlie Grand Alliance in World War II was the U.S. economy; the decisive
advantage of Great Britain in its second hundred years war with France
from 1689 to 1815 was in the organization of its public finance (the ability
to run and manage a national debt, because of an efficient system of
taxation); while the decisive advantage of the Byzantine Empire for the first
five hundred years of its existence (until the 1040s) was the stability of its
gold-based currency.
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. politicians and strategists, while ostensibly
separating economics and political-military strategy, demonstrated an underlying belief in
the relevance of economic vitality. Although President Harry S. Truman institutionalized
the concept of Soviet containment as the preeminent postwar U.S. national security
objective, he believed that "national security does not consist only of an army, a navy, and
an air force. It rests on a much broader base. It depends on a sound economy." 185
Dwight D. Eisenhower, perhaps better than any other postwar U.S. president,
understood the economic dimensions of security: "Beyond a wise and reasonable level,
which is always changing... money spent on arms may be money wasted... National
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security requires far more than military power. Economic and moral factors play
indispensable roles. Any program that endangers our economy could defeat us." 186
Both Truman and Eisenhower were suggesting that the economic aspects of national
security go well beyond the simple need to create wealth that can pay for armies. They
recognized that a sound economy in and of itself is a national interest worth protecting.
As America's complex economy comes to depend more and more on international trade-
trade that is increasingly by way of Asia-U.S. grand strategy must adjust to this reality.
Grand strategy is faced with two fundamental concerns in regard to economic
security: first, how should America organize its "own house" in order to produce the
strongest possible economy vis-a-vis Northeast Asia; and second, how should the U.S.
handle the competing economies of the region, particularly the trade practices of Japan and
China. The remainder of this chapter will address these questions in three sections:
macroeconomic stability and infrastructure; trade and industrial policy; and strategic
industry.
A. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
There are several reasons to be concerned for America's economic future.
Theodore Sorensen in a 1990 essay published in Foreign Affairs notes:
We have [he world's largest trade deficit. We are losing our competitive
position, our market share in both domestic and export markets, in one
after another of the industries in which our leadership was once vaunted:
consumer electronics, machine tools, automobiles, steel, advanced
computers, semiconductor chips, laser printers, and design and
manufacturing technology. We have become dangerously dependent upon
foreign sources (once again) for the energy that we consume at a higher
rate than any other nation to fuel ourfactories , homes and transportation
systems. We have the largest gap between earnings and savings, the
Quoted in Romm Defining National Security 53.
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highest budget deficit (in absolute terms) and one of the lowest rates of
productivity growth of any nation in the industrialized world. We have
become—thanks to our trade deficit and the enormous foreign borrowings
required in light ofour low savings rate and large federal budget deficits—
the world's largest debtor. 1
*'
Sorensen goes on the argue that if these trends are allowed to persist, "this nation's
economic effectiveness and independence—meaning the flexibility to make decisions and
the ability to fend for oneself—would indeed be endangered." Though not all analysts
paint such a gloomy picture, most would agree that America faces serious economic
challenges.
In Northeast Asia, U.S. economic policy is particularly salient. Trade relations
with Japan. America's nearest competitor, and China, potentially the world's largest
economy will no doubt play a vital role in future national security calculations. Although
unfair trade practices on the part of Japan and China are a reality, much of the blame for
poor U.S. economic performance can be attributed to shortcomings in American
macroeconomic policy and infrastructure.
Macroeconomic imbalances among the world's major economies have contributed
significantly to declining U.S. economic competitiveness. While the 1980s saw Japan
keep the yen artificially low to promote exports, the strong Reagan dollar led to a surge
of cheap imports and decimated American export industries by pricing U.S. goods out of
foreign markets. "Creating a stable macroeconomic environment must be a central
objective of a U.S. strategy toward Japan." 188
Another challenge facing the American economy is simply that "the United States
consumes more than it produces and does not save enough to build the additional
productive capacity to make up the difference, leading to a trade deficit that supplies
1X7
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excess American consumption and inflows of foreign capital that make up for insufficient
American savings. " 18g Moreover, this extremely low domestic savings rate means U.S.
banks have less funds available to make loans, and thus the cost of borrowing is higher.
Unlike their Japanese counterparts who. as a consequence of extraordinarily high Japanese
savings rates (around 20 percent), have access to affordable capital, U.S. borrowers pay
a much higher cost, and are therefore less willing to make long-term investments.
Particularly unappealing to U.S. investors are projects involving industrial modernization
or infrastructure because these investments do not produce immediate or guaranteed
results. The outcome is that U.S. industry lacks needed reinvestment, and consequently
cannot keep pace with productivity gains being made in Japan. China, and South Korea.
Similarly, the federal budget deficit contributes to the trade imbalance. By
spending more than it takes in. the government creates a demand for goods and services
that is out of equilibrium with supply. This unbalanced situation can culminate in two
possible outcomes: very high inflation, or the offsetting of inflationary pressures by
importing large quantities of cheap goods.
U.S. grand strategy should address these macroeconomic problems at their root.
A first step in providing for the national economic security of the United States is to
reduce, and eventually eliminate the federal budget deficit. Once thought an impossible
task, there now seems to be a consensus for doing so. Though budget cutting is a process
that goes well beyond U.S. Northeast Asia policy, the transition to a grand strategy of
selective engagement in that region would provide the sort of political and military
economizing required by deficit reduction.
A second step toward setting America's macroeconomic house in order is to
establish policies aimed at gradually altering U.S. behavior toward savings and
consumption. Although some would argue that America's economy is consumer-based,
lxs
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and should not be tinkered with, a slight redirection could significantly improve U.S.
economic security. Unlike the economy of the immediate postwar period, today's U.S.
economy depends heavily on international trade. Just as the Japanese have found success
in an economy characterized by high personal savings rates, the United States would reap
several benefits from a shift in this direction. Several options are available, most notably
the incremental revision of U.S. tax codes to encourage higher savings by private citizens.
Moreover, this policy shift could serve as a partial solution to another dilemma: the
"graying" of America, and the troubled future of Social Security. Through programs
similar to a tax-deferred (or even tax-exempt) individual retirement account, the federal
government could both encourage personal savings, and lighten the load on future tax-
payers. As a consequence of higher savings. U.S. lenders would be in a better position
to make affordable loans to domestic business and industry, thus adding to productive
capacity, and allowing for the modernization of industry and infrastructure that is needed
if American firms are to compete against the highly subsidized leading-sector industries
of Japan. China and South Korea.
As a third step. U.S. grand strategy should recognize that government has a role
in constructing and improving domestic infrastructure, as well as creating a favorable
international environment for U.S. economic interests. Of particular salience to national
security is the cultivation of a versatile and well-educated workforce for both direct and
indirect security applications that can compete against increasingly competent workforces
in Japan. China, and South Korea. U.S. national security planners should take a keen
interest in ensuring that federal policies are addressing shortcomings in the education of
American youth, and providing encouragement and incentives for meaningful training by
private institutions and industry. 190
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Finally, national security policy should endorse steps to create a more viable free
trade environment, both in Northeast Asia, and globally. C. Fred Bergsten. in an essay
tor Foreign Affairs, contends that while the GATT Uruguay Round is a step in the right
direction, much more is needed:
The Big Three [U.S., European Community , Japan] should thus push for
the implementation offour sweeping new reforms by 2000: (I) elimination
ofall tariffs on all industrial trade; (2) a complete ban on all quantitative
trade barriers including 'voluntary export restraint agreements'; (3) a sharp
expansion in the independence and mandate given the GATT to police the
system; and (4) creation of an instrument similar to the GATT for
investment issues to provide a stable frameworkfor international corporate
activities (and help resist protectionist pressures in this area, notably in the
United States). An even bolder approach would be agreement to finally
establish the 'International Trade Organization, ' to cover all these issues
and many more, [fiat was originally intended to be the comprehensive 'third
leg' of the postwar economic system (along with the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank). Ivl
An affirmative step in the direction of Northeast Asian free-trade was taken at the
Jakarta session of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, in November 1994, in
the form of an agreement in principle to end most import and export tariffs by 2010 in the
United States. Japan, and other developed countries; and in less-developed Asia-Pacific
states by 2020. l9: If carried out. this decision could significantly improve the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in Northeast Asian markets, and contribute to the economic
welfare, and thus national security, of the United States.
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B. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY
While macToeconomic policy may be helpful in solving the problem of America's
chronic trade deficits with Northeast Asia, other measures may also be warranted.
Throughout the Cold war. U.S. policies have allowed unfair trade practices on the part of
East Asian allies in order to bolster their economies and sustain the bilateral security
arrangements necessary to contain the Soviets. "While these countries pursued
mercantilistic policies at odds with American free-market and free-trade doctrines, for
purposes of grand strategy the United States averted its eyes and clung to the fiction of
similarity, even as its industries succumbed one by one to East Asian competitors who
were not behaving at all as Western economic principles said they should." 193 The end of
the Cold War, and the options presented by a grand strategy of selective engagement,
means that the U.S. no longer needs to maintain the fiction that America and Japan have
coinciding economic interests. This realization would allow the U.S. to acknowledge the
systemic differences between American and East Asian economies and deal with them in
a more flexible and pragmatic manner. Rather than overlook unfair trade practices, or try
to remake Northeast Asian economies in the American image, U.S. negotiators should
focus on areas in which inequities exist and push for full resolution through formal
procedures.
194
Karel van Wolferen. in his article "The Japan Problem Revisited," acknowledges
that hard bargaining with the Japanese is necessary, but cautions:
... it must be made clear tliat the politically protected economic system of
Japan is not an evil entity. It is, rather, a system driven by different
motives that must be reckoned with in the foreign policies of other states.
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Washington miisi address the deep, underlying sense of insecurity tfiat helps
shape Japan 's motives. Various symbolic actions are available to help
Japanese powerholders believe that the world is not against them, such as
giving Japan a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Such a move,
however, should only be considered as part of a larger covenant.
195
There is good reason not to push America's Northeast Asian trade partners too far,
too fast. The first possibility, particularly in regard to Japan, is that excess U.S. pressure
may result in a trade war. Sorensen notes, "declaring war—a trade war—would represent
a resounding defeat for our country, dependent as it is on an open trading system. Even
to name and blame a supposed 'enemy' would only handicap our effort to keep that system
open.""*
A second undesirable possibility is that too much pressure from the U.S. to rapidly
open markets might contribute to the fragmentation of the world into partially exclusive
trading blocs, and bring an end to the relatively free international trade system that has
flourished in the postwar period, largely under U.S. auspices. Presumably, three blocs
would form: a European bloc, led by Germany: a North-South American bloc, led by the
United States: and an Asian bloc, probably led by Japan. Such an arrangement would not
only edge America out of Northeast Asian markets, but would be inherently unstable, with
each bloc harboring suspicions about the joint economic intentions of the other two.
"Moreover, an Asian bloc would in itself be very unstable, as it is highly doubtful that the
expanding Southeast Asian economies would long accept the subcontractor position that
Tokyo's businessmen and bureaucrats have in mind for them." 197
In addition to an active trade policy, U.S. economic interests vis-a-vis Northeast
Asia could be advanced by way of an industrial policy. A U.S. industrial policy for
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Northeast Asia would not endeavor to maintain precarious leadership in declining sectors,
or create mechanisms to prop up and protect uncompetitive industries, rather, U.S. policy
should offer encouragement, incentives and research assets to domestic firms that show
potential in promising markets. Though inducements would preferably be offered in the
form of tax-incentives, direct assistance might also be beneficial in some sectors. "It is
eminently logical to use part of the 'peace dividend' that may result from lessened defense
outlays to finance these expenditures, since they will be aimed at achieving many of the
same national goals-preserving America's world role and national security—as the military
programs that will be cut." 198
If America is to develop a true industrial policy, a crucial question will be who is
to administer it. Currently "no one agency of the federal government has broad
responsibility for research and other activities related to civilian technology or for strategic
coordination of technology policy at the national level." 199 In the executive branch,
responsibility for R&D is dispersed among twelve agencies. In Congress, the civilian
science budget is divided among as many as thirteen appropriations subcommittees. This
arrangement may have some logic, but it makes prioritization and compromise virtually
impossible. Furthermore:
The problem is compounded by the lack offederal focus on technology's
economic implications. Individual agencies are responsible for the research
and technology that relate solely to their particular missions. Only the
Department ofEnergy and the Department ofAgriculture extend theirfocus
to economic performance, and then only in specific sectors. 200
198vx Bergsten "The World Economy" 105.
199 BR. Inman and Daniel F. Burton. Jr., "Technology and Competitiveness: The New
Policy Frontier." Foreign Affairs Spring 1990: 129.
:"" Inman and Burton 130
114
The economic aspects of grand strategy would be well served by the creation of an
independent agency, perhaps along the lines of the Federal Reserve Board, to coordinate
and oversee U.S. industrial policy. Ideally, a U.S. agency for trade and industry would
be staffed with highly qualified trade and industry experts, as well as area specialists, and
headed by long-term appointees who would be insulated from executive and legislative
political interference. By committing time and resources to economic planning today, an
agency for trade and industry could reap valuable long-term economic gains, and thus
advance the interests of U.S. national security. "The same kind of effort that we mounted
to achieve technological superiority in the military arena must now be mounted to integrate
our military technology with commercial activities, to translate our edge in basic research
and innovation into competitive and marketable high-tech products, to become more adept
at improving existing industrial technology, and to move those improvements more quickly
to market with firm control of both cost and quality." 201
C. STRATEGIC INDUSTRY
While the purpose of an industrial policy is to encourage and promote the growth
of domestic industries that show potential, other U.S. manufacturing capabilities should
be preserved for more traditional security reasons. In The Japan TJiat Can Really Say No,
the Japanese politician and author Ishihara Shintaro wrote of the Persian Gulf War: "What
made [the Americans'] pinpoint bombing so effective was PVT, a high-quality
semiconductor used in the brain part of the computers that control most modern weapons.
There were ninety-three foreign-made semiconductors in the weapons used by the United
States. Among them, ninety-two were made in Japan." America "should wake up from
this illusion" of superpower status because it "had to ask other countries to contribute
:
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money so it could fight, and it depended on foreign technology to carry out its war
strategy.
Undoubtedly. America's defense industrial base has undergone a process of
globalization. In some respects, this globalization is advantageous to U.S. national
security, as "it brings superior performance, innovation and lower prices for military as
welJ as commercial purchasers." 203 The danger, however, stems from situations in which
one. or very few nations control the supply of technology that is vital to U.S. national
security. In such cases. " a survey of post-World War II experience suggests that external
domination of technology, goods and services may well lead to persistent attempts at
meddling, manipulation and harassment in the recipients' sovereign affairs, even in
peacetime relations among allies." 204
Dependence on foreign technology poses a dilemma for U.S. grand strategy in
Northeast Asia: although American economic security depends on the maintenance of the
free trade system; and the U.S. defense establishment benefits from the high-quality,
affordable products that are its result; relying on a small number of foreign distributors for
vital technologies may compromise America's national sovereignty and security. In order
to solve this dilemma, U.S. grand strategy requires a market-oriented compromise "that
reflects both the desire for competition and the imperatives of national policy." 205
Theodore Moran. in his study "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries:
Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence." proposes criteria for determining if the
concentration of external suppliers of a particular technology is such that a genuine threat
to security exists:
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As a first approximation of the critical threshold, the defense industrial
strategist can draw on standard measures of oligopoly strength, for
example, that no four countries or four companies supply more than fifty
percent of the arm 's-length world market. This 4/50 rule of thumb, which
has proven useful in economic and anti-trust policy, suggests that iffour
actors control less t/ian fifty percent ofa market, the difficulties of collusion
overwhelm their ability to coordinate policy even if they share a common
objective. The 4/50 rule applied to countries would complicate collusion
for political manipulation; the 4/50 rule applied to companies would
complicate corporate collusion on oligopoly pricing or other predatory
practices that discriminate among buyers (e.g., delayed delivery of new
products), of which the Japanese fiave been accused.
206
In circumstances where America has lost, or is in danger of losing the capability
to produce certain strategic goods or services, criteria like these would assist U.S. strategic
planners in determining if their loss poses a threat to national security. Accordingly, those
in which the sources of external supply are concentrated do represent a source of concern
and should be eligible for "national security" trade protection: those in which the sources
of external supply are deconcentrated do not. "In sum, the security objective of
maximizing efficiency and innovation in vital national industries while avoiding foreign
dependence requires channeling popular protectionist and neomercantilistic instincts into
those narrow areas in which foreign domination actually poses a genuine threat." 207
When it is determined that trade protection is warranted on the basis of national
security, the form of protection applied should be appropriate to the circumstances. Moran
asserts that tariffs are less distorting than quotas, and hold the added bonus of producing
rents for the home government. 208 Harrison and Prestowitz contend that results-oriented
bargaining would often be successful, particularly if the United States were to make it
206 International Security Summer 1990: 82.
207 Moran "International Economics" 81-82.
:" x Moran "America's Defense Industries" 87.
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clear "that it will do what is necessary to sustain them [threatened strategic industries] both
through positive domestic programs and appropriate countermeasures." 20 ' Finally, Dam,
Deutch. Nye. and Rowe maintain:
Offsetting subsidies to U.S. producers impose the lowest costs on the
economy because they still allow American consumers to enjoy low prices.
Retaliatory tariffs impose higher costs than subsidies because they also
raise prices to consumers, but they are still an acceptable unilateral
response. Quotas (either VERs [Voluntary Export Restraints] or otherwise)
should never be chosen. They not only impose the same deadweight costs
as tariffs but are also highly distorting to economic growth. 21°
In addition to its roles of grand facilitator, honest broker and engaged balancer,
U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia can contribute to security by placing greater
emphasis on the maintenance and progress of the nation's economic well-being. While
Japan's concept of "comprehensive security" may have its flaws (and limitations), there
is also much to be learned from that nation's success. Whether the U.S. approach takes
the form of an industrial policy, managed trade, macroeconomic measures, or steps to
improve the productivity of American industry is not now the central issue. What is
important is that U.S. policy-makers acknowledge that economic strength is an
indispensable component of long-term national security. "The basic message is clear:
national security can no longer be viewed in exclusively military terms; economic security
and industrial competitiveness are also vital considerations." 211 The passing of the Cold
War. and the demands of modern Northeast Asia, require that matters of economic and
trade policy should no longer be subservient to military affairs.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
National interests comprise the underpinnings of U.S. grand strategy in Northeast
Asia. Because grand strategies are meant to provide a framework for long-term planning,
the interests that guide those policies must be broad and enduring. By examining U.S.
interests through the lens of history, and consulting the Constitution, it is possible to
deduce the nation's most basic national security interests: defense of the United States and
its constitutional system: enhancement of the nation's economic well-being: creation of a
favorable world order; and the promotion of U.S. democratic values and the free-market
system. Although each of these interests can have direct application to Northeast Asia,
taken together they suggest that the most fundamental U.S. security interest in Northeast
Asia is the maintenance of a stable and effective regional environment in which no one
state reigns preeminent.
While the end of superpower confrontation has eased tension throughout Northeast
Asia, it has also created a new set of circumstances, and thus altered the nature of regional
threats to U.S. security interests. The relatively stable bi-, or tripolar structure that
characterized Northeast Asian state-to-state relations during the Cold War has given way
to a more complex and dynamic multipolar environment. No longer constrained by the
imperative of retaining U.S. security guarantees, America's postwar allies may
increasingly find the political courage to step out of line with U.S. policies.
Struoural factors could also influence the security environment in post-Cold War
Northeast Asia. Without the restraint provided by the threat of escalation to global nuclear
war. long buried indigenous conflicts may reemerge to threaten regional stability. Another
possibility is that differential economic growth, and the resulting shift in the regional
balance of power, could create tensions and conflict. Finally, the geo-political world
views that shape policy in Beijing, Moscow, Seoul and Pyongyang pose a clanger if those
nations perceive a disequilibrium in Northeast Asian power relations.
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Domestic sources might also contribute to regional instability. A civil war in
China, or worse yet. its disintegration, would undoubtedly bring about enormous upheaval
throughout Northeast Asia. Similarly, continued turmoil within Russia might result in any
number of outcomes that would be detrimental to regional security. Additionally, the
prospect of Korean reunification, while in many ways a positive step for Northeast Asian
stability, might also be seen as a threat in Tokyo and Beijing. Lastly, internal pressure on
Tokyo to reform its postwar foreign and security policies may eventually produce a Japan
whose political and military power is commensurate with its already immense economic
strength. While Tokyo should be encouraged to play a larger role, and take more
responsibility for regional security, if Japan's transition to a "normal power" is not
properly managed by U.S. grand strategy, the result could be damaging to America's
interests in Northeast Asia.
Threats to fundamental U.S. security interests might also be heralded by regional
trends in military doctrine. Although Northeast Asian armed forces are, in some respects,
becoming smaller, their offensive capabilities are on the increase. The large, land-oriented
force structures of the postwar period are being replaced by leaner, more mobile forces,
whose emphasis is on high-tech air- and sea power. These "post-Desert Storm" forces are
characterized by enhanced capabilities for rapid offensives and power projection, and are
governed by more aggressive doctrine. These trends could indicate the genesis of a
regional "cult of the offensive." much like the dogma that guided pre-World War I
military doctrine in Europe. The propagation of offensive doctrine throughout Northeast
Asia could aggravate instability, and further endanger U.S. security interests.
The complex and uncertain security environment that has taken shape in post-Cold
War Northeast Asia has perplexed U.S. strategic planners. From the "New World Order"
to a strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement." America's leaders have struggled to find
a new direction for national policies. The end result, however, has not been the
120
construction of an appropriate grand strategy for the new era, but rather the continuation
of policies guided by Cold War inertia.
Contemporary grand strategy for Northeast Asia is rooted in four flawed precepts:
tlrst. U.S. policies assume that preeminence is sustainable, and that America will remain
the undisputed political, military, and economic leader of Northeast Asia into the
foreseeable future; second, the forward deployment of large, ground-based units,
specifically in Japan and South Korea, must continue; third, the U.S. will be able to
assemble and lead coalitions based on the concept of collective security to protect its
interests: and finally. America should retain its binding, bilateral security arrangements
with Japan and South Korea.
A plethora of factors have conspired to make these precepts unsuitable for a post-
Cold War grand strategy. Powerful domestic and international forces in both Northeast
Asia and the United States mandate that U.S. planners find more flexible and cost-effective
policies to secure America's interests in the region.
In its most basic form, a grand strategy for the new era would contain diplomatic,
military, and economic elements. Diplomatically, a grand strategy of selective
engagement would strive to shape the Northeast Asian security environment by keeping
the United States actively engaged in world politics. Moreover, such a foreign policy
would endeavor to maintain geo-political balances, and ensure regional stability.
The diplomatic aspects of U.S. grand strategy would, first, recognize that while
the age of economic interdependence may have signaled the end of geo-politics in Western
Europe, this is not yet the case in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, U.S. security policy
would make allowances for the regional balance of power, and harness its dynamics for
the benefit of America's security interests. Second, U.S. foreign policy would begin the
task of gradually transforming America's binding security relationships with Japan and
Korea into the more flexible arrangements required by a balance of power environment.
Third, America would position itself to serve in the roles of regional balancer, grand
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facilitator, and honest broker. Finally. U.S. policies would aspire to create a framework
through which responsibility for Northeast Asian security can be incrementally shifted way
from sole reliance on the United States, and toward a more balanced arrangement
involving all regional actors.
The dilemma posed by Japan presents a challenge for U.S. diplomacy operating
under a grand strategy of selective engagement. East Asian fears of a resurgent Japan
cannot be discounted. Whether real or imagined, perceptions of Tokyo's intentions could
prompt regional actors who feel threatened by Japan to react in a manner inconsistent with
normal balancing, thus creating instability and conditions prejudicial to U.S. security
interests.
This Japan-inspired conundrum demands that the United States take an active role
in ushering Japan onto the world stage as a leading character. First, American policy-
makers would carefully guide the transformation of the U.S. -Japan relationship to ensure
that Tokyo develops security policies and structures that are acceptable both to Japan and
the United States, and not perceived in Northeast Asia as threatening to the regional
equilibrium. Second, the U.S. would work to ease any security dilemmas that might result
from Japan's rise to great power status by enmeshing Japan in a network of regional and
international institutions.
The military aspects of a grand strategy of selective engagement would be maritime
in nature, and capitalize on the flexibility and freedom of maneuver available to an insular
state. Not currently faced with a continental hegemon, the U.S. has the option of
foregoing a heavy, land-based forward defense, while still retaining the capability to act
unilaterally, or multilaterally, in the strength, venue, and fashion of its choosing.
The transfigured security environment of post-Cold War Northeast Asia not only
allows, but mandates that the United States begin to decrease its reliance on a forward-
deployed military posture. In its place, a maritime grand strategy would rely on mobile,
flexible forces, deployed by sea or air from U.S. or international territory, to demonstrate
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resolve, police trouble spots, protect interests, or enable the introduction of heavier forces
when required. Such an approach requires a renewed emphasis on power projection, joint
force sequencing, and the assets dictated by the needs of strategic lift. Moreover, if at a
future point the United States is required by circumstances to return to a more continental
focus, the maritime grand strategy would provide the time and space necessary for
transition.
Finally, the economic aspects of national security have taken on added importance
in the post-Cold War era. The grand strategy of selective engagement recognizes this
reality, and would place greater emphasis on economic elements. Rather than advance an
agenda based on rigid ideology, national strategy would serve economic security in an
eclectic manner. Focusing on macroeconomic stability and infrastructure, as well as
industrial policy and strategic industries, grand strategy would approach economics with
two goals in mind: maintaining a rising standard of living for America's population; and
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